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Three Essays in the Economics of Food Marketing 
 
 
Xun Li, Ph.D. 
 
University of Connecticut, 2014 
 
 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies of food marketing, which 
directly and indirectly affects consumers’ purchase behavior, reshapes their eating 
habit, and alters social welfare. Chapter one investigates the advertising spillover 
effects using the carbonated soft drinks market as a case study. In this chapter, 
spillover effects are modeled using the conventional linear and constant elasticity 
of substitution (CES) advertising production functions. Empirical results confirm 
strong and positive brand advertising spillover effects across brands belonging to 
the same company as well as negative spillover effects from advertising by 
competitors. Empirical results also indicate that the CES advertising production 
function outperforms the linear function, providing strong support for decreasing 
returns to scale in advertising and imperfect substitution between brand advertising 
  
and advertising of other brands in the same company. Finally, the CES function 
results in significantly higher estimates of the price elasticities of demand as well 
as lower estimated markups.  
        Chapter two applies a stochastic frontier approach to rigorously ascertain the 
effects of food environment components on obesity outcomes. Using individual 
consumer data and food environment data from New England counties, empirical 
results indicate that supercenters and limited service restaurants are positively 
associated with weight outcomes, while fruit and vegetable stores and full-service 
restaurants are negatively linked to weight gain. In metropolitan counties, however, 
food environment factors that affecting weight outcomes are full-service 
restaurants and limited-service restaurants. In non-metropolitan counties, food 
environment components affect weight outcomes significantly only in counties 
adjacent to a metropolitan area. In counties that are not adjacent to a metropolitan 
area or which are completely rural, the associations between food environment 
components and weight outcome are consistently weak.  
        Chapter three contributes to the debate on food and energy prices by 
examining the relationship between milk and diesel prices and price pass-through. 
Empirical results indicate that energy price (e.g., diesel price) significantly impact 
the prices of milk products. The pass-through rates are around 0.6227. More 
interestingly, most of private labels have the lowest energy (diesel) pass-through 
  
rates, implying that comparing to other products, private labels are more 
invulnerable to energy price shocks. 
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Chapter 1 
Spillover Effects of TV Advertising: The Case of Carbonated Soft Drinks 
 
1.1 Introduction 
        Although advertising can significantly affect consumer choices of food and 
beverage products (e.g., Zheng and Kaiser, 2008; Gao and Lee, 1995; Kaiser and 
Reberte, 1996; Kinnucan and Forker, 1998; Dharmasena, Kapps and Clauson, 
2010; Tchumtchoua and Cotterill, 2010; Cohen and Rabinowitz, 2012; Bagwell, 
2007), relatively few studies include it in empirical demand models of food and 
beverage products. Even when included, advertising spillover effects are typically 
analyzed at an aggregate sector level, such as U.S. non-alcoholic beverage 
industries (e.g., Zheng and Kaiser, 2008), or include generic advertising promoting 
an entire industry rather than specific brands. In the very limited brand-level 
studies of advertising spillover effects, one way to account for spillover effects of 
brand advertising is to consider a function that weights both brand and company 
advertising.
1
 Previous studies include company as well as brand advertising and 
treat them as perfect substitutes by using a linear functional form, which also 
implies that advertising exhibits constant returns to scale, i.e., if advertising for 
                                                          
1
 Brand advertising is the advertising of a specific brand. Company advertising is advertising promoting all brands 
within the same company and is used herein as the advertising of other brands within a company.  Spillover effects 
here refers to the phenomenon that brand advertising may have impacts on the demand for other brands that belong 
to the same company or to competitors. 
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each brand is doubled, its effect on brand demand is also doubled (e.g., Erdem and 
Sun, 2002; Balachander and Ghose, 2003). These underlying assumptions are 
contradictory to the likely existence of non-constant returns to scale in advertising.  
        According to Bagwell (2007), decreasing returns to scale may occur (1) as 
less responsive consumers are reached, or (2) as an increasing number of messages 
must be sent in order to reach a consumer that has not been exposed to 
advertising.
2
 A number of empirical studies also offer evidence that advertising 
effectiveness is subject to diminishing returns. Thomas (1989) finds advertising 
diseconomies in the cigarette and soft drink industries, while Seldon, Jewell and 
O’Brien (2000) find them in the U.S. beer industry. When spillover effects of 
advertising are important, ignoring them or assuming constant returns to scale in 
advertising might lead to biased estimated price and/or advertising coefficients.    
        This article uses the carbonated soft drinks (CSDs) industry as a case study. 
Several features make this industry a relevant case to examine advertising spillover 
effects. First, CSD brands belonging to the same company can be clearly identified 
                                                          
2
 “Decreasing returns to scale” and “diminishing marginal returns” are two confusing concepts. The term “return to 
scale” arises in the context of a firm’s production function. It denotes the quantitative change in output of a firm or 
industry resulting from a proportionate increase in all inputs. The term “decreasing marginal returns” means that the 
productivity of a variable input declines as more is used in short-run production. As Simon and Arndt (1980) 
mention, when discussing advertising quantities, writers inevitably have in mind an increase in advertising alone. 
Here we consider the advertising as the only input, so decreasing returns to scale and the decreasing marginal returns 
are similar. Here we follow Bagwell (2007) and use the term “decreasing returns to scale.” 
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and spillover effects measured.
3
 Second, the major CSD manufacturers (Coca Cola, 
PepsiCo and Dr. Pepper) emphasize non-price competition such as advertising, 
highlighting the importance of appropriately modeling the effects of advertising on 
consumer choices. Third, CSDs are the most heavily advertised beverage products 
in the United States. The Coca Cola Company spent $267 million in 2010, 
competing with PepsiCo’s $154 million and Dr. Pepper’s $104 million (Zmuda, 
2011). Last but not least, CSDs lead the beverage category and have been 
identified as the primary contributor of calories in the ongoing obesity epidemic 
(Vartanian, Schwartz and Brownell, 2007; Pereira, 2006; Malik, Schulze and Hu, 
2006; Brownell et al., 2009; Marriott et al, 2010; Johnson and Yon, 2010; Lopez 
and Fantuzzi, 2012). According to Zmuda (2011), in 2010 the average American 
drank 45 gallons of CSDs per year. Thus, understanding how consumption is 
affected by advertising can serve as a basis for policies aimed at regulating 
advertising of CSDs (e.g., Seidman, 2011), as is done in France, Denmark and 
Sweden (IACFO, 2003), or regulating advertising of fast foods, as in Canada (Dhar 
and Baylis, 2011). 
        This article contributes to the advertising literature by measuring and testing 
for the degree of advertising spillover effects through nesting brand and company 
                                                          
3
 A maintained assumption in this article is that the consumer is fully aware of what manufacturer brands belong to 
each of the three major companies. While identifying companies is obvious when the brand name contains the 
company name (e.g., Coke Zero), some consumers may not link brand names that do not contain the company name 
(e.g., Mountain Dew, which belongs to PepsiCo). However, the leading brands of each company do contain the 
company name in the brand name and are the heaviest users of TV advertising. 
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advertising via a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) advertising production 
function. It is the first to apply a CES production function to advertising. The 
results for the CSD market indicate that brand advertising has a positive and 
significant impact on the demand for all brands belonging to the same company, 
thereby “lifting all boats” within a company. As in previous studies, we find that 
competitors’ advertising has a negative and significant impact on demand for 
CSDs of a given firm. Moreover, the CES advertising function outperforms the 
conventional linear form, providing strong evidence of decreasing returns to scale 
in advertising and, therefore, of imperfect substitution between brand and company 
advertising, rejecting the common assumption of a linear advertising production 
function.  Finally, the CES function results in significantly lower price elasticity of 
demand and estimated markups. 
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1.2 Empirical Strategy 
1.2.1 The Demand Side  
For the purpose of this article, consumers are assumed to choose a CSD brand in 
two steps. First, they choose a CSD company (or an outside good) and then a 
specific CSD brand within that company.
4
 There are G companies which are 
regarded as clusters or “groups” of brands facing consumers. Following Berry 
(1994) and Kusuda (2011), the utility of consumer   from choosing one unit of 
product     (        ) is assumed to be: 
                                                           ,                                   1.2.1         
where                is the mean of the utility.     is a vector of observable 
product characteristics,    is the price of product  .    is the utility shocks observed 
by the consumer but not the researcher. The second component     is common to 
all products in group                   extreme value. Parameter   is between zero 
and one, determining the within-group correlation of utility levels. As   
approaches one, the within-group correlation of the utility level goes to one, and as 
  approaches zero, the within-group correlation goes to zero. Based on Cardell 
(1997),              is an extreme value random variable.  
                                                          
4
 Alternative paradigms could include grouping CSDs by selected characteristics such as calorie content (diet vs. 
regular) or flavor (e.g., Lime Sprite vs. 7 Up). Given our interest in company advertising spillover effect, we 
consider companies as clusters. In our model, the effects of similarity of characteristics are captured by including the 
brand-specific characteristics. 
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  The market share of brand   in group   is given by 
                                                       ⁄  
    
  
   
 
∑     
  
   
    
                                          1.2.2                     
and the probability of choosing one of the group   products ( the group share) is 
                                                             
  
     
∑   
     
 
                                             1.2.3 
where    ∑    (
  
   
)      Thus, the market share of brand   can be simply 
expressed as 
                                                                      ⁄                                            1.2.4 
  Normalizing the utility for the outside good to zero, the nested logit model is                      
                         (   )                            ⁄                     1.2.5   
        Following Dubé, Hitsch and Manchanda (2005), advertising is modeled as a 
goodwill stock in order to capture the carry-over effects of advertising’s impact on 
demand. Advertising goodwill      for CSD brand   in time period   is given by 
                                                        ∑  
  
                                       1.2.6 
7 
 
where     is a function of current and past advertising,     represents advertising 
for product   in time period  , and           is a geometric decay parameter.5 The 
advertising aggregator is defined as  
                                                {
                
                                  
                        1.2.7 
        A linear advertising production function is given by            
      , where the first term denotes brand advertising and the second term 
denotes advertising of other brands belonging to the same company. Note 
regarding the spillover effects parameter     that where     no spillover 
effect is indicated.  A CES advertising production function
6
 is given by: 
                                                        
        
   
 
  ⁄                      1.2.8 
where    
   
 
 and   is the elasticity of substitution.   measures returns to scale, 
and when      or      advertising has corresponding increasing or decreasing 
returns to scale. When             , the CES advertising production function 
collapses to the linear form. Competitors’ advertising is obtained by aggregating 
the goodwill of the brands belonging to them, given by 
                                                               ∑        ,                            1.2.9                    
                                                          
5
 Note that at this point, we are leaving open the empirical definition of A (e.g., expenditure or exposure). 
6
 Note that      is total advertising effect brought by brand advertising and company advertising, and is different 
from    . Equation (8) is generalized. 
8 
 
where   denotes brands not belonging to firm     Incorporating (8) and (9) into (5), 
the estimating model becomes: 
              
       (     
        
  )
 
  ⁄          
   (     ⁄ )                                                                                                   1.2.10 
where   is the coefficient for the advertising spillover effect from competitors.  
        When brands   and   belong to group  , the own- and cross-price elasticity of 
demand of brand   are, respectively: 
                                  
  
   
   
 
   
   ⁄      (    )   ⁄    ,               1.2.11 
and 
                                           
 
   
   ⁄      (    )   ⁄    ,                     1.2.12 
while when brands   and   are in different groups, the cross-price elasticity is given 
by: 
                                                                    ⁄                                        1.2.13                       
        An increase of brand  ’s advertising level will directly increase the demand 
for itself and decrease the demand for all other brands (business-stealing effect or 
cannibalism), which can be measured by   
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,                                    1.2.14 
where       if     and       if    , and   denotes any brand. Second, the 
increase of brand  ’s advertising level (   ) will increase the total advertising 
output for the whole company, which will in turn affect the demand of brand   
(spillover effect), which is denoted as  
                                          
   
 ∑           
 ∑           
    
   
  
.                       1.2.15 
Third, the competitive effect (i.e., the effect on the demand for brand  ,  in another 
group      ) can be measured by  
                                                  
   
 ∑         
 ∑         
    
   
  
.                           1.2.16 
 
1.2.2 Markups  
        A representative firm   maximizes the aggregated profits across all its brands, 
   The firm takes prices and advertising levels of all other firms’ brands as given 
when it sets prices and advertising level for its own brands. The profit 
maximization problem is  
                                      ∑ (      )   (       )       ,                  1.2.17 
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where    is price for brand  ,  is market size,    is marginal cost for brand  , 
and    is the fixed production costs of firm  . The first-order condition with 
respect to price for brand   is  
                              (       )  ∑         
            
   
     .                1.2.18 
        Following Berry (1994), differentiating the market share equation (4) with 
respect to the mean utility for brand j yields 
                                         
   
   
 
 
   
         ⁄          ,                   1.2.19 
Thus, from 
   
   
 
   
   
   
   
 and equation (19), the price-cost markup at equilibrium is 
given by 
                                                        
   
       ⁄           
 .                     1.2.20 
        To assess the implications of spillover effects, we estimate the model under a 
linear and a CES advertising production function and compare the price and 
advertising elasticities and price cost margins as well as statistical performance. 
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1.3 Data 
        To estimate the demand model, we combine two Nielsen datasets, both 
obtained from the Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy at the University of 
Connecticut. One is the Homescan dataset depicting households’ brand-level CSD 
purchases in grocery stores, drug stores, vending machines, and online shopping 
sites in 9 designated market areas (DMAs) on a weekly basis from February 2006 
to December 2008.
7
 The records of the Homescan dataset include information on 
product characteristics (e.g., package size and name of brand), marketing (e.g., unit 
price and promotion displays), location and time of each purchase, and household 
demographics. The second dataset is television advertising consisting of weekly 
brand-level Gross Rating Points (GRPs) from national (cable, network and 
syndicated) and local (spot) television advertising for each DMA.
8
 These two 
datasets are combined at the bi-weekly level, directly linking TV brand advertising 
exposure to CSD purchases. Since Dubé, Hitsch and Manchanda (2005) report an 
estimated advertising decay parameter of 0.89 with weekly data, here a decay 
parameter of 0.79 (i.e., 0.89^2) is used for bi-weekly data. Data for the prices of 
                                                          
7
 A designated market area (DMA) is a geographic area defined by Nielsen Media Research Company as a group of 
counties that make up a particular market. These counties comprise the major viewing audience for the television 
stations located in their particular metropolitan area. The areas do not overlap, and every county in the United States 
belongs to only one DMA. The DMAs in this article are New York, Detroit, Boston, Washington DC, Atlanta, 
Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles and Seattle. 
8
 Gross ratings points are a commonly used measure of advertising exposure (    in equation (6)). They are 
calculated as the percentage of the targeted audience that views an advertisement times the frequency. 
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aluminum and electricity inputs are, respectively, from the Index Mundi (2012) 
and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (2008).
9
 
        The market share is computed based on the potential market size, which is 
defined as combined per capita consumption (in gallons) of the top 14 CSDs plus 
the outside good (juices, milk and other CSDs) times population for each period 
and DMA. Following convention, each DMA and time period combination is 
treated as a separate market, resulting in 684 markets (9 DMAs x 76 bi-weekly 
periods).  
        Since each of the 14 CSD brands are observed in each market, we end up with 
9,576 market-level observations (14 times 684).  Product characteristics include 
price, nutritional characteristics, and television advertising.  Sugar, sodium and 
caffeine content are key nutritional indicators that affect CSD choices (Lopez and 
Fantuzzi, 2012). Table 1 lists CSD brands and product attributes for 14 leading 
CSDs from three companies (Coca Cola, PepsiCo, and Dr. Pepper) and provides 
summary statistics for them as well as their market shares, prices and TV 
advertising GRPs, which are averaged across the nine DMAs and the 76 bi-weekly 
periods. Coke Classic Regular, Pepsi Regular and Dr. Pepper Regular are the most 
popular among brands of the company they belong to, with market shares of 5.17%, 
                                                          
9
 Index Mundi is a platform containing various data concerning selected attributes and characteristics of counties, 
including detailed county statistics, charts and maps compiled from multiple sources. 
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4.56% and 1.49%, respectively. Correspondingly in the advertising levels (194.3, 
180.0 and 192.9, respectively), are also top within their company brands.  
        Figure 1 illustrates the pattern of GRPs in Boston for the two leading soda 
brands, Coke Regular and Pepsi Regular.
10
 For Coke Regular, the largest peak for 
advertising happened during the August 2008 Olympics. Roughly speaking, the 
fluctuation of advertising for the two brands follows the pattern that one brand hits 
the bottom when the other reaches the peak, although the variation of advertising 
for Coke Regular is more exaggerated.  
 
1.4 Estimation and Results 
        Following Berry (1994), price and within-group market share are regarded as 
endogenous variables since retailer prices and within-group market shares depend 
on unobserved product and consumer characteristics. Advertising is also 
potentially endogenous because it might correlate with some unobservable 
company strategies that will affect demand. To eliminate potential biases due to 
endogeneity, a set of instrumental variables is used in the identification procedure 
including product nutritional characteristics, input cost variables (such as the price 
of aluminum, price of electricity and average price of advertising), DMA dummies, 
                                                          
10
 Here we use Boston as an example since other cities show similar patterns. 
14 
 
and seasonal dummies. In addition, Hausman-type instruments (Hausman, 1994), 
such as average within-group market share and average advertising level in other 
cities, are also used. The Sargan's test and first stage F-stats are used to test 
whether the instrumental variables are valid and relatively strong. The Durbin 
statistic (1954) is applied to test endogeneity of the variables. After estimation, the 
model specifications are compared via values of the root mean square percentage 
error (RMSPE). A smaller RMSPE indicates a better fit of the model (Vu, Hammes 
and Im, 2012). 
        The two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach is applied for the linear 
advertising model and the two-stage residual inclusion (2SRI) approach for the 
CES model. The 2SRI estimator has been shown to provide more consistent 
estimates than two-stage predictor substitution (2SPS) in nonlinear models (Terza, 
Basu and Rathouz, 2007). The results are presented in the following section.  
        Table 2 presents the estimation results from three model specifications: (1) 
excluding company advertising and competitors’ advertising (no spillover effects); 
(2) with spillover effects, using a linear advertising function form; and (3) with 
spillover effects, using a CES advertising function form. The Durbin statistic 
validates that price, advertising and within-group market share are endogenous. 
The Sargan’s test results and the first stage F-stats indicate that the instrumental 
variables are valid and relatively strong. Values of the RMSPE indicate that model 
15 
 
3 outperforms model 2, and that model 2 is a better fit when compared to model 1.  
Overall, the preferred model is 3 using the CES advertising production function.
11
  
        Nearly all key parameter estimates in Table 2 are highly statistically 
significant and all have the expected signs. Consumers have a negative response to 
price (-2.683) and a positive response to both brand advertising (0.249) and 
company advertising (0.745), which highlights the importance of including 
company advertising to account for spillover effects. It is interesting to note that 
the price (and non-advertising) coefficients in models 1 and 2 are not significantly 
different. This implies that simply including advertising in a linear production 
function model (model 2) leads to similar price and non-advertising coefficients as 
using a demand model that does not include advertising at all (model 1).  However, 
both price coefficients are significantly smaller (by nearly 40%) in absolute value 
than the estimated price coefficients using the CES advertising form (model 3). 
Thus, the CES model shows greater price responsiveness and, therefore, more 
price-elastic demands. The dramatically different estimates of price coefficients 
under linear vs. CES advertising models (-1.93 vs. -2.683) highlight the importance 
of appropriate model specification for advertising spillover effects, particularly 
when price policy instruments (e.g., taxes) are being considered. In addition, stark 
                                                          
11
 We also checked model 3 for robustness. First, the CES was compared to a Cobb-Douglas specification of 
advertising production and, based on the root mean square percentage error, the CES significantly outperformed the 
Cobb-Douglas form. Second, the result was also robust to alternative lags of GRPs in the computation of advertising 
goodwill.   
16 
 
differences are also apparent for all non-advertising coefficients.  Table 2 also 
shows that the CES specification leads to significantly greater responsiveness to 
brand and company advertising, meaning that a linear form would also lead to 
underestimation of the impacts of advertising on demand. 
        As expected from previous work, competitors’ advertising has a negative 
impact on demand. The magnitude of that result is robust across the linear and CES 
specifications. The CES advertising function shows a strong degree of decreasing 
returns to scale. The elasticity of substitution parameter indicates brand and 
company advertising are far from being perfect substitutes. Moreover, the 
estimated within-group heterogeneity parameter indicates that consumers’ utilities 
are highly correlated for brands within a company.   
        Predicting the market share is important for a company’s marketing strategy, 
and Table 2 also illustrates the predictive power of the three model specifications. 
To create out-of-sample predictions, the three models are estimated with data from 
the first 71 biweekly-periods and then used to predict market shares in the last 5 
periods. In Table 2, the out-of-sample mean squared errors (MSE) are reported 
following Dubé (2004). The MSE value of model 3 is the smallest, indicating that 
including advertising spillover effects in a CES function has the best predictive 
power.  
17 
 
        Table 3 reports average own-price elasticities and cross-price elasticities 
under alternative advertising models, averaged over all 684 markets.
12
 Note that 
model 3, which accounts for brand and company advertising using a CES function, 
produces higher own-price elasticities of demand. In fact, the CES model produces 
price elasticities that better align with those estimated in previous studies. For 
example, Dubé (2004) reports the elasticity in the -2 to -3.6 range for specific sizes 
and brands of CSDs; Dhar et al. (2005) reports them between -2.7 and -4.4, and 
Chan (2006) reports own-price elasticity for CSDs at household level are between -
5 and -11. It is worth noting that in each nest, the elasticity of the most popular 
brand is significantly lower than the elasticities of less popular brands. Between 
groups, the elasticity of brands within the relatively popular company is generally 
lower than within the least popular group (e.g., Coca-Cola Company vs. Dr. Pepper 
Company). In addition, all the cross-price elasticities are positive, indicating that 
all of these brands are, to some extent, substituted. For example, for Coke Regular, 
the price changes of the other three brands in Coca-Cola Company positively 
impact the demand of Coke Regular. The impact from Coke Diet is largest. One 
possible explanation is that Coke Diet is more similar in brand identity to Coke 
Diet compared with Sprite Regular and Coke Zero. Very similar patterns are found 
in other companies’ products. 
                                                          
12
 For simplicity, we report only the own-price elasticities of demand. 
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        Table 4 presents the average advertising elasticities of demand for all three 
models. All the own-advertising elasticities are less than one. The own-advertising 
elasticities calculated based on model 3 are lower than those based on the other 
two models, especially for the most popular brands (e.g., Coke Regular, Pepsi 
Regular and Dr. Pepper Regular). In models 1 and 2, the own-advertising elasticity 
of the most popular brand is significantly lower than the elasticities of less popular 
brands (e.g., Coke Regular vs. Dr. Pepper Regular or Coke Regular vs. Coke Diet). 
These findings are consistent with Dubé (2004). However, in model 3, all the own 
advertising elasticities are of similar magnitude and around 0.25. It is worth noting 
that the two models (2 and 3) that include spillovers of brands within the same 
company result in positive cross-price elasticities of advertising indicating that the 
spillover effect dominates the cannibalism effects of brand advertising within the 
same company. At the same time, when including spillover effects, the impact on 
sales of competing company brands is estimated to be larger than when spillover 
effects are ignored in the model. 
In addition, according to the Dorfman-Steiner rule (Dorfman and Steiner, 
1954), these results suggest an optimal advertising-sales ratio of about 9 percent 
for the 14 brands taken as a whole. The estimates are also consistent with 
Basmann’s adding up condition (Basmann, 1956), which intuitively states that if 
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advertising is effective at increasing demand for the advertised product, it must 
also decrease demand for some other products. 
        Table 5 reports the estimated price-cost markups and Lerner Indexes for each 
brand. The models are consistent that Coke Diet has the largest degree of and 
Mountain Dew Regular the smallest degree of market power. Note that model 3 
produces significantly lower markups and Lerner Indexes, which is consistent with 
higher estimated price elasticities of demand. The Lerner Index estimates based on 
model 2 range from 0.181 to 0.330, and those based on model 3 from 0.106 to 
0.195.
13
  
        These findings imply the importance of properly modeling advertising in 
demand models.  For example, Berning (2011) points out that because brand 
advertising can affect the price elasticities of demand, excluding it from the model 
can lead to misleading estimated impacts of simulating taxes on CSDs, particularly 
under 100% pass-through rates. Second, given the growing problem of obesity and 
especially childhood obesity, governments are considering a variety of policy 
solutions, including banning advertisements of so-called unhealthy food and 
beverages. An example is the Children's Food and Beverage Advertising Initiative 
(CFBAI) (Better Business Bureaus, 2014).  However, there has been concern that 
                                                          
13
 Tollison, Kaplan and Higgins (1991) report that the profit margin of the Coca Cola Company was 0.124; Dubé 
(2005) reports the margin for Coke Classic 12 packs, for example, as 0.433; Dhar et al. (2005) report the Lerner 
Index for Coke within a Bertrand game as 0.26; and Deichert et al. (2006) report the profit margin of Coca-Cola 
Company as 0.22. 
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this recent voluntary agreements to restrict advertising is not working well (Kunkel, 
McKinley and Wright, 2009). One reason could be the spillover effects of 
advertising (Berning and McCullough, 2013). If policy only curtails the advertising 
of some brands, CSD consumption cannot be cut to the expected level due to the 
existence of advertising spillover effects from other brands belonging to the same 
company.  
 
1.5 Conclusions 
This article confirms that company advertising as well as brand advertising is a 
significant shifter of demand at the brand level. Thus, to properly account for the 
impact of advertising on consumer choices, empirical work should incorporate not 
only brand advertising but also company advertising, as the latter is a “rising tide 
that lifts all boats” in a company’s product portfolio. However, these effects can be 
characterized in two ways. One is that there is a significant degree of decreasing 
returns to scale in advertising; the other is that brand and company advertising are 
quite far from being perfect substitutes. If properly modeled, company spillover 
effects due to high correlation of consumer association of brands within the same 
company point to brand advertising spillover effects on company-wide demand has 
nearly equally important.  From a modeling standpoint, a CES advertising 
production function outperforms the linear form as well as excluding advertising in 
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the demand model altogether.  It also leads to significantly higher estimated price 
elasticities of demand and lower price-cost markups, indicating a more competitive 
pricing behavior.   
        Two avenues for future research seem fruitful. Whereas this article focuses 
primarily on demand effects, one is to extend the model by endogenizing 
advertising decisions in the context of a portfolio. It is important, for instance, to 
include modeling the supply side of the market, as induced price changes can have 
an important bearing on the direct and spillover effects of advertising. Further 
work might also consider social media, which are increasingly used as a substitute 
for traditional advertising by the CSD and other beverage and food industries.  
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Chapter 2 
Food Environment and Weight Outcomes: A Stochastic Frontier Approach 
 
2.1 Introduction 
        Obesity in the United States has been increasingly cited as a major health 
issues in recent decades. In 2010, approximately 36% of American adults and 17% 
of children were obese (Ogden et al., 2012). A substantial volume of previous 
work has focused on the obesity epidemic and the effectiveness of policy 
interventions to curb its incidence. In addition to factors such as individual socio-
demographics (including income, age, race, number of children, gender, etc.), 
behavioral characteristics (e.g., smoking, drinking, etc.) and socio-economic 
factors (e.g., labor market conditions, economic recessions and peer effects), food 
environment is receiving increasing attention. 
        Food environment is defined by the National Cancer Institute (2013) to 
include “food stores, restaurants, schools and worksites.” Similarly, McKinnon et 
al. (2009) categorized the food environment as the “food store environment (e.g., 
grocery stores, supermarkets, specialty food stores, farmers’ markets, and food 
pantries); restaurant food environment (e.g., fast food and full-service restaurants); 
school food environment (e.g., cafeterias, vending machines, and snack shops in 
daycare settings, schools and/or colleges); and/or worksite food environment (e.g., 
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cafeterias, vending machines, snack shops).” The USDA (2013a) defines food 
environment factors as store/restaurant proximity, food prices, food and nutrition 
assistance programs, and community characteristics as they interact to influence 
food choices and diet quality. This paper emphasizes the availability of food 
outlets of different industrial categories. Following Bonanno and Goetz (2010), 
food outlets are categorized in this paper by industry definitions, which include 
supermarkets and other grocery stores, convenience stores, fruit and vegetable 
markets, warehouse clubs and supercenters, full-service restaurants and limited-
service eating places.     
        Supermarkets generally offer high-quality and low-cost food (Powell et al, 
2007). Morland,Diez Roux and Wing (2006) report that the presence of 
supermarkets is associated with a lower prevalence of obesity and overweight. As 
for grocery stores, Chen et al. (2010) find that the effect of improvements in access 
to chain grocers on body mass index (BMI) varies depending on community 
characteristics. More specifically, increasing access to chain grocers in low-income 
communities decreased the average BMI for all respondents by approximately 0.3 
points.  
        Convenience stores are generally regarded as posing an increased risk of 
obesity since they generally offer less variety, higher prices and lower quality 
produce than supermarkets (Zenk and Powell, 2008).  For example, Morland et al. 
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(2006) find that convenience stores are positively associated with a higher 
prevalence of obesity and overweight. 
        Fruit and vegetable markets as well as local agriculture are also documented 
as factors that impact weight outcomes. By examining the diet of school-aged 
children and adults, Lin and Morrison (2002) provide evidence that consuming 
fruit and vegetables decreases BMI. Berning (2012) shows that access to local 
agriculture (farmers’ markets and community supported agriculture) is negatively 
associated with weight gain. 
        Warehouse clubs and supercenters are also linked with the prevalence of 
obesity.  Using data from the Behavior Risk Factor Surveillance Survey (BRFSS) 
matched with Wal-Mart Supercenter entry dates and locations, Courtemanche and 
Carden (2010) find that the density of Wal-Mart Supercenters is positively 
correlated with obesity rates. 
        Full-service restaurants are generally regarded as serving healthier foods. 
However, the role of full-service restaurants is still controversial. Some researchers 
find evidence that full-service restaurants are associated with lower weight status. 
For example, Mehta and Chang (2008) analyze the relationship between a 
restaurant environment and weight status across counties in the United States, 
finding a negative association between availability of full-service restaurants and 
25 
 
the prevalence of overweight and obesity. However, some researchers, for example 
Powell and Nguyen (2013), find that full-service restaurant consumption is 
associated with a net increase in daily total energy intake of 160 kcal for children 
and 267 kcal for adolescents. They conclude that full-service restaurant 
consumption is associated with higher net total energy intake and poorer diet 
quality.  
        Other studies find that access to low-quality food away from home, 
particularly from fast-food restaurants, has a positive effect on obesity rates. For 
example, Chou, Grossman and Saffer (2004), combining state-level data with 
individual demographic and weight data from the BRFSS, present evidence that 
the per capita number of fast-food restaurants positively affects rates of obesity. 
Currie et al. (2010) find that an increase in fast-food restaurants leads to an 
increase in obesity and weight gains among ninth-graders and pregnant mothers. 
Dunn (2010) employs an identification strategy based on county-level variation in 
the number of fast-food restaurants and shows that their availability is correlated 
with increased BMI among females, and among non-whites in counties with 
medium population density. However, Anderson and Matsa (2011), using food-
intake micro data and correcting for endogenous location of establishments, find 
no causal link between food consumption at restaurants (both fast-food and full-
service restaurants) and obesity. 
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        Previous work has focused on the impact of different aspects (e.g., outlets) of 
the food environment on weight outcomes. However, a comprehensive study of the 
relationship between food environment and weight gain is lacking. The omission 
of an analysis that comprehensively includes various components of food 
environment can lead to not only biased results but also disallow a direct 
comparison of the importance of different determinants of weight outcomes. 
Comprehensively measuring the impact of the food environment on weight 
outcomes requires an integrated framework that accounts not only for food 
environment factors but also for consumer characteristics. 
        This paper applies a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) to extend the health 
production function development by Grossman (1972), using BMI as output, based 
on consumers’ demographics and behavioral characteristics and treating food 
environmental factors as determinants of deviations from the frontier. The food 
environment can affect weight outcomes in different ways. First, food 
environments can affect food-access costs. In general, people living in poor food 
environments need to pay more (e.g., time, transportation costs) to obtain food. 
The diversion of resources into unproductive uses leads to inefficiency (Collier, 
1999). Second, different food environments imply different availability of types of 
food (e.g., healthy and unhealthy) in consumers’ choice set. In poor food 
environments, healthy foods are fewer so that consumers’ choices are bounded and 
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they cannot allocate limited resources efficiently. Third, in the long run, the food 
environment might reshape people’s eating styles and habits, leading to 
inefficiency. For example, there is evidence from medical research that the 
nutrients in fast food are inherently addictive (Colantuoni et al., 2002; Grigson, 
2002; Del Parigi et al., 2003).  
        Using New England data at the county level, our empirical results indicate 
that supercenters and limited-service restaurants are positively associated with 
weight outcomes, while fruit and vegetables store and full-service restaurants are 
negatively linked to weight gain. In metropolitan counties, food environment 
factors affecting weight outcomes are full-service restaurants and limited-service 
restaurants. In non-metropolitan counties, food environment components affect 
weight outcomes significantly only in counties adjacent to a metropolitan area. In 
counties that are not adjacent to a metropolitan area or which are completely rural, 
the associations between food environment components and weight outcome are 
consistently week. In addition, this paper evaluates the BMI production “efficiency” 
associated with different aspects of food environment, ranks them by counties, and 
suggests policy implications.  
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2.2 Empirical Strategy 
        The empirical framework relies on a stochastic production function and an 
equation for the determinants of inefficiency, where the explanatory variables of 
the inefficiency term include food environment indicators. Adapting the health 
production function proposed by Grossman (1972), a stochastic frontier health 
production function with technology inefficiency is given as: 
                                                                 ,                            2.2.1 
where   is the health status,   is inputs, including demographic characteristics 
such as age, education, race, income, gender, and behaviors such as drinking and 
smoking, and Z stands for the fixed effects of location and time.   is the 
unobservable individual characteristics that make the production frontier stochastic. 
  is non-negative random variables, associated with technical inefficiency of 
health production. The production function       is deterministic output, given 
input combinations.  
               is assumed to take a Cobb-Douglas form. Taking the logarithm of 
both sides, the empirical model is given by:  
                                                         
                                             2.2.2 
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where subscript  ,   denotes individual consumer   in food environment  .     is 
the log measure of health outcome;    denotes the log of consumer characteristics; 
    is a random symmetric disturbance accounting for noise assumed to be 
independently, identically distributed with a mean of zero and variance   
 ;      is 
an asymmetric error term that accounts for systematic deviations from the frontier 
due to food environment factors where individual   resides. 
        Given that weight gain is associated with negative health outcomes such as 
type II diabetes, hypertension, cardiovascular disease and disability, the empirical 
model in (2) can be expressed as:  
                                                              
        ̃                           2.2.3 
        Figure 1 illustrates equation (3). The deviation from the deterministic frontier 
can be decomposed into two effects: noise effect (     and inefficiency effect ( ̃   . 
If there is no inefficiency effect, the BMI outcomes lie at the point (     
 ) or 
(     
 ), which are ideal levels of BMI outcomes. With inefficiency brought about 
by food environments and other social-economic factors, the observation points of 
BMI outcome level are (     ) or (     ). 
        Here, the BMI production efficiency index is defined as       ̃    (Farrell, 
1957). A higher efficiency index of BMI production indicates one can produce 
BMI closer to the ideal level. A higher value of  ̃   indicates a higher BMI level 
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above the ideal level and a lower BMI production efficiency (equivalently, higher 
BMI product inefficiency) and thus, higher health risks. 
        This paper follows Battese and Coelli (1993), who estimated a stochastic 
frontier model incorporating a technical inefficiency term that is a linear function 
of several factors. Specifically, the following function is estimated along with the 
production function in (3): 
                                                         ̃      
                                          2.2.4 
where    
  denotes a set of indicators for food environment and other social-
economic factors,   is a corresponding vector of parameters, and     is a random 
error that distributes independently of     and follows a truncated normal 
distribution with a zero mean and variance   
 , with truncation point at     
  , i.e., 
        
  . In this study, components of food environment, such as the density 
of food stores and restaurants, are included in explanatory variable     to test 
whether the food environment causes inefficiency for BMI production.   
 
2.3 Data 
        Table 1 presents the definitions and descriptive statistics of county-level 
variables and individual-level variables. It shows that the densities of full-service 
restaurant and limited-service restaurant are much higher (0.954 and 0.939, 
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respectively) than those of other food environment components. Average BMI 
(26.502) with standard deviation (5.026) indicates that being overweight is 
common in New England. The main data source we used to estimate the model is 
the BRFSS annual survey data from the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention during 2001-2010. This survey consists of a self-reported response of 
more than 350,000 consumers throughout the United States, and provides data on 
body mass index (BMI) and consumer characteristics and on health care, risky 
behaviors, disease prevalence and preventive health practices. Individuals with a 
BMI below 12 or above 90 are omitted as a standard practice, and only individuals 
between 18 and 75 years old are included in this analysis (Dunn, 2010). In addition, 
pregnant women and individuals who reported “disabled” as their employment 
status are omitted from this analysis.   
        To obtain indicators of the food environment, we grouped the individual 
observations by county and matched them with data from the U.S. Bureau of the 
Census (USBC), County Business Patterns for 2001-2010 to include the number of 
establishments in the following industries: supermarkets and other grocery stores 
(NAICS 44511), convenience stores (NAICS 44512), warehouse clubs and 
supercenters (NAICS 45291), fruit and vegetables stores (NAICS 44523), full-
service restaurants (NAICS 72210), and limited-service eating places (NAICS 
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72211). 14  Following Dunn (2010) and Courtemanche and Carden (2010), we use 
numbers of food outlets per 1000 persons to approximate availability. Normalizing 
by population implicitly assumes that all food outlets and population are uniformly 
distributed across a county. The population data used in this paper are from USCB 
Population Estimates Program. 
        Other data sets used in this paper including median income, crime rates 
(including violent crime and property crime) are respectively from USBC Small 
Area Income and Poverty Program estimates and U.S. Department of Justice 
Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics. The numbers of highway exits are collected 
from Wikipedia. Other information like square miles of land in each county, is 
taken from the USCB Gazetteer of Counties. 
 
 
                                                          
14
 According to the definition from U.S. Bureau of Census (USBC), NAICS 44511 comprises establishments 
generally known as supermarket and grocery stores primarily engaged in retailing a general line of food, such 
as canned and frozen foods, fresh fruits and vegetables, and fresh and prepared meats, fish and poultry. NAICS 
44512 comprises establishments known as convenience stores or food marts (except those with fuel pumps) 
primarily engaged in retailing a limited line of goods that generally include milk, bread, soda and snacks. The 
establishments in industry NAICS 44523 are primarily engaged in retailing fruits and vegetables via electronic 
home shopping, mail-order, or direct sales, and growing and selling vegetables and or fruits at roadside stands.  
NAICS 45291 includes warehouse clubs and supercenters primarily engaged in retailing a general line of 
groceries in combination with general lines of new merchandise, such as apparel, furniture, and appliances. 
The establishments in industry NAICS 72211 are primarily engaged in providing food services to patrons who 
order and are served while seated and who pay after eating. The industry NAICS 72221 comprises 
establishments primarily engaged in providing food services where patrons generally order or select items and 
pay before eating; most of these establishments do not have waiter/waitress service, but some provide limited 
service, such as cooking to order (i.e., per special request), bringing food to seated customers, or providing off-
site delivery. 
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2.4 Estimation and Results 
        Since the respondents in the BRFSS survey data are not the same over time, 
the data structure is not a panel. Therefore, observations are pooled. The 
availability of food outlets is potentially endogenous, arising from two sources. 
One is the correlation between the availability of food outlets and unobservable 
individual characteristics. For instance, an individual’s eating habits, health 
consciousness and demand for food might affect his/her BMI level as well as the 
presence of food outlets. The other is the correlation between the density of food 
outlets and county characteristics. For example, food outlet establishments are 
more likely to enter counties where there is a better environment and lower crime 
rate, which also affect weight outcomes. 
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        To account for endogeneity, this paper follows Dunn (2010) by including a set 
of instruments as well as a standard set of county-level controls: median income, 
population density, crime rates (including violence and property crime).  
Instrumental variables used in this paper include the number of highway exits 
(Dunn, 2010), and the three-period lag of density of food environment components 
(Rashad, Grossman and Chou 2006).  Highway exits are explicitly explained as 
                                                          
15
 An example from Dunn (2010) is that restaurants may be more likely to open in wealthier counties, which are also 
more likely to have grocery stores, clean parks and beaches, farmers’ markets and low crime rates. Restaurants may 
concentrate in densely populated counties where individuals are more likely to walk to work or use public 
transportation. Alternatively, densely populated areas may inhibit exercise opportunities, such as bicycling or 
running. Counties with large distances between residential and commercial areas will tend to attract restaurants 
along commuting routes, and decrease the amount of time available for preparing meals at home and exercising. 
Another example is from Sturm (2008), who finds that convenience stores are located closer to the schools with 
more Hispanic and Black students. 
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valid instruments for fast food restaurants. Given that convenience stores are 
frequently combined with gas stations, which are generally located near highway 
exits, the number of highway exits is also a good instrument for convenience stores. 
In addition, food outlets usually expand based on market demand. The current 
availability of food outlets is likely to be correlated with consumers’ demand in the 
current period or last several periods. To address this, three-year-lagged variables 
for food outlet availability are used as instruments because they are unlikely to 
correlate with the unobserved demand shocks (Rashad, Grossman and Chou 2006).  
        In addition, physical activity, risky behavior (smoking and drinking), and 
retirement are also potentially endogenous. For example, people who care more 
about their weight and health are more likely have higher level of physical activity. 
People who care less about their health may smoke and drink, resulting in different 
weight outcomes compared to non-smokers and non-drinkers. The endogeneity of 
these variables is addressed by using instrumental variables, including age, gender, 
income, and education, number of highway exits, population density, beer tax, 
cigarette tax, and wage rates. Limited maximum likelihood estimation is applied to 
estimate the model.  
        The estimated parameters (and associated statistics) of the full sample of New 
England counties (i.e., metropolitan counties and non-metropolitan counties), 
based on the U.S. Department of Agriculture  (2013b) Rural-Urban Continuum 
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Codes shown in Table 2, are reported in Table 3.  Metropolitan counties include 
three types of counties (codes 1, 2, 3) and non-metropolitan counties include six 
(codes 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9). In Table 3, nearly all parameters for the production frontier 
are statistically significant and show the expected signs. The estimated parameters 
show that age and number of children are positively associated with BMI. The 
impact of education level and income level is not linear. A higher level of 
education is associated with a higher BMI, while higher income level is negatively 
linked with BMI. Females, whites and Asians have relatively lower weights 
compared with Blacks and Hispanics. Married people are found to have higher 
BMIs. Behaviors like physical activity and drinking are negatively associated with 
high weight outcomes. Being retired is likely to increase weight. 
        In addition, the availability of fruit and vegetable restaurants and full-service 
restaurants, based on the full sample, is negatively associated with weight gain, 
while supercenters and limited-service restaurant are positively linked to weight 
outcomes. People in the counties with high median income or higher population 
density are found to have a lower likelihood of gaining weight. 
        The estimated parameters for metropolitan counties and non-metropolitan 
counties in Table 3 provide a different picture. Full-service restaurants are 
negatively associated with weight outcome for both metropolitan counties and non-
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metropolitan counties. In metropolitan counties, limited-service restaurants 
positively affect weight outcome.  
        To gain further insights, the model is estimated using six segmented samples. 
The first three are, respectively, “counties in metro areas of 1 million population or 
more,” “counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population,” “counties in 
metro areas of population less than 250,000.” The other three segments are “non-
metro counties, urban population more than 2500 and adjacent to a metro area,” 
“non-metro counties, urban population more than 2500 and not adjacent to a metro 
area,” and “completely rural or urban population less than 2,500.” The parameter 
estimates and associated statistics are presented in Table 4 and Table 5. 
        Table 4 reports the results of three segments in metro counties. In the metro 
counties with populations greater than 1 million, fruit and vegetable stores and full-
service restaurants contribute to BMI negatively, while supercenters and limited-
service restaurants are positively associated with BMI. However, in the counties 
with populations between 250,000 and 1 million, supermarkets affect weight 
outcomes negatively. In the third segment of metropolitan counties (populations 
less than 250,000), no significant impacts are found. More interestingly, estimates 
for socio-economic factors indicate that significant effect by crime rate is only 
present in the counties with populations greater than 1 million. In those counties 
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with higher crime rates, people are likely to have higher weight gain, a possible 
reason being that a high crime rate might discourage outdoor activity. 
        Table 5 reports the estimates results for another three segments in non-metro 
counties. Food environment only significantly affects BMI production inefficiency 
in counties adjacent to metro areas with populations of more than 2500. The 
empirical results show that supermarkets and full-service restaurants are negatively 
associated with weight outcomes, while limited-service restaurants are positively 
associated with weight outcomes. No significant estimates are found in counties 
that are not adjacent to a metro area with a population more than 2,500 or in 
counties that are completely rural. Another finding is that the crime rate is only 
significantly associated with BMI production in counties adjacent to metro areas. 
        With the estimate results, Farrell’s (1957) technical efficiency index is 
calculated for each individual by county and presented in Table 6. (Due to missing 
data, six counties were dropped.) Suffolk County, in Massachusetts, ranks first and 
Somerset County, in Maine, last. Figure 2 is a map of the BMI production 
efficiency index from 2001-2010 using ArcMap 10.2, which is categorized into 
four levels illustrated by different colors.  The low efficiency areas are clustered in 
northern New England (Maine) and high efficiency areas are clustered in southern 
New England (i.e., Connecticut).  
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2.5 Conclusions 
        This paper estimates the “efficiency” of weight production using a stochastic 
frontier model with individual and county-level data that includes nearly 200,000 
observations in New England between 2001 and 2010. A major contribution of this 
paper is extending the framework of a health production function to a stochastic 
production model, which provides a useful approach for researchers and policy 
makers to evaluate the effects of changes in food environments on health outcomes, 
such as weight. Another contribution is the inclusion of all food environment 
components into a single analytical framework. Moreover, the paper contributes to 
the literature by investigating the effect of food environment within different 
contexts (i.e., metro counties v.s. non-metro counties), which provide policy 
makers with more accurate insights.  
        Empirical results confirm that the effects of food environment factors on BMI 
vary with a county’s characteristics. For instance, both full-service and limited-
service restaurants have significant effects on weight outcomes in counties with 
populations greater than 1 million, while convenience stores only significantly 
affect weight outcomes in counties with populations between 250,000 and 1 
million. Supermarket and grocery stores exert negative impacts on weight 
outcomes in metro counties with population less than 1 million and non-
metropolitan counties that are adjacent to a metropolitan area. These findings 
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extend the existing literature, such as Anderson and Matsa (2009), Dunn (2010) 
and Chen et al. (2010). 
        As the estimation results suggest that the effects of food environment factors 
are concentrated in specific geographic contexts, any policy interventions intended 
to modify any food environment should take the location of counties into 
consideration. For example, restrictions on the fast food (e.g. hefty taxes) might be 
implemented in metro areas with populations greater than 1 million and non-metro 
counties adjacent to a metro area. 
        Another contribution of this paper is the inclusion of socio-economic factors 
in the investigation. For example, this paper finds that crime rate positively affects 
weight outcomes in metropolitan counties and rural counties adjacent to 
metropolitan areas, indicating that providing a safe living community is, 
potentially, and another way to curb prevalence of obesity. 
        All of these findings can help policy makers better understand the impact of 
changes in food environments on obesity and, as a result, to develop public policies 
to promote commercial development that is consistent with a healthier population. 
However, it is clear that there are many questions that our analysis does not answer. 
Further work would be fruitful in the following ways. First, one can investigate the 
relationship between food environment and weight outcomes with high-quality 
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data sets that contain detailed information, such as locations of consumers as well 
as food outlets. Another direction could be an application of natural experiments, 
which can better address the endogeneity problem. 
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Chapter 3 
Do Milk and Energy Prices Move Together? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
        In the last decade, U.S. food and energy prices have experienced a dramatic 
increase, resulting in a dual food and energy price inflation that has had a 
significant negative impact on U.S. consumers. The previous literature sheds light 
mainly on the relation between oil prices and agricultural commodity and food 
prices. Generally speaking, the causal link between oil and food prices is explained 
by two mechanisms (Reboredo, 2012). First, oil affects production costs directly, 
given that agriculture is an energy-intensive sector. For example, Hanson, 
Robinson and Schluter (1993) find that an increase in oil prices caused a rise in 
input costs and a corresponding rise in agricultural commodity prices. The strength 
of this effect depends on several factors, such as the relative importance of oil in 
the production cost structure and the market power of agriculture to pass costs on 
to prices. Second, on the demand side, the increased price of oil has significantly 
raised demand for corn- and soybean-based biofuels. Chen, Kuo and Chen (2010) 
show that higher crude oil prices have induced a higher derived demand for corn 
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and soybean and greater competition for the planted areas of other grains, resulting 
in changes in grain prices for corn, soybeans and wheat. 
        Previous studies have also found evidence of oil and agricultural commodity 
price causality. Hameed and Arshad (2008) report evidence of the influence of oil 
on food prices based on cointegration analysis. Nazlioglu (2011) provides evidence 
of a non-linear relation between oil and agricultural prices. Furthermore, partial 
and general equilibrium models have also been widely used to access the 
sensitivity of agricultural commodity prices to oil price shocks (e.g., Ignaciuk and 
Dellink, 2006).  
        However, some empirical studies have found no evidence regarding an oil-
food price nexus. For example, Zhang et al. (2010) find agricultural commodity 
prices to be neutral to the effects of oil price changes over the long run. Gilbert 
(2010) explains the recent upward trend in agricultural prices by distinguishing 
between common and market-specific factors, reporting evidence of the neutrality 
of market factors like oil price and biofuel demand. 
        In a word, to the best of my knowledge, the previous studies have linked 
agricultural commodities and price indexes to oil price rather than focusing on 
specific retail products. More specifically, there are no previous studies directly 
linking milk and energy prices, although the relationship between milk and energy 
prices is so important to daily life.   
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        Milk and milk prices provide a good case study for examining the relation 
between energy and food price inflation. First, as a staple food, milk is more 
nutritious (proteins, minerals and vitamins) and contains fewer calories than other 
beverages, particularly carbonated soft drinks and fruit juices. More importantly, 
given the prevalence of obesity and over-consumption of soda, milk is considered a 
good substitute for soda (Runge, Johnson and Runge, 2011). Milk prices are 
closely connected with consumers’ welfare and social well-being, particularly 
children’s, highlighting the importance of understanding the relationship between 
energy and milk prices. Third, energy (e.g., diesel) price plays an important role in 
milk production as well as transportation (Brush, Masanet and Worrell, 2011).  
        This paper estimates the demand for fluid milk in Boston with a random 
coefficient logit model, which allows a more flexible curvature of the demand 
curve. This property provides flexible pass-through rates that are not driven solely 
by the functional form assumption. Empirical results indicate consumers prefer 
milk products with lower prices, lower fat content and smaller sizes. In addition, 
consumers prefer to buy private labels compared with other brands. This research 
also finds that private labels have lower elasticities as well as higher market power. 
Finally, energy prices (e.g., diesel and electricity) significantly impact the cost of 
milk products. The pass-through rates are around 0.6227. More interestingly, most 
of the private labels are found with the lowest energy (diesel) pass-through rate, 
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which is consistent with the relatively stable price of private labels, indicating that 
private labels are less vulnerable to energy price shocks. 
 
3.2 Empirical Strategy        
        Cost pass-through rates measure the proportion of a change in input costs that 
is transmitted to price (Kim and Cotterill, 2008). There are two ways in which to 
model price pass-through: (1) a reduced form or single equation model; (2) a 
structural model involving demand and supply. A reduced-form analysis is simple 
but disadvantageous for inferring the degree of market competitiveness without 
knowing the benchmark pass-through rate (Kim and Cotterill, 2008). In this study, 
a structural model is applied with consideration of firms’ competitive interaction. 
This study uses a random coefficient logit model to capture consumer choices in 
the context of product and consumer heterogeneity. The supply side (i.e., margins 
or marginal costs) is derived in a post-demand estimation stage. The indirect utility 
of consumer   from purchasing milk brand   in market  is: 
                                                            𝜇        ,                    3.2.1 
where the indirect utility      can be decomposed into three parts: a mean utility 
term     , which is common to all consumers; a brand-specific and consumer-
specific deviation from that mean 𝜇   ; and idiosyncratic tastes     , where      is 
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a mean zero stochastic term distributed independently and identically as a type I 
extreme value distribution. The mean utility     =    
   +      includes a vector     
of key product characteristics of relevance to consumers;       is unobserved 
product characteristics. The utility deviations are          
      , where   is a 
scaling matrix, and random part    are assumed to have a standard multivariate 
normal distribution. Then the probability that consumer   purchases a unit of brand 
  in market  is,  
                                                
      𝑚+𝜇𝑖 𝑚  
 + ∑    
𝐽
 =    𝑚+ 𝜇𝑖 𝑚 
.                                  3.2.2 
        The market share of the   th brand corresponds to the probability that the  th 
brand is chosen in market m, given by 
                          ∫  {(        )                   }                  3.2.3 
where   is a vector of consumer taste parameters; k=0 denotes the outside good; 
and G(v) and      are cumulative density functions for the indicated variables, 
assumed to be independent of each other.  
The price elasticities of brand   in market  can be expressed as below: 
                     
   𝑚
  𝑘𝑚
 
 𝑘𝑚
  𝑚
 { 
  𝑚
  𝑚 ∫ 𝑖 𝑖 𝑚(   𝑖 𝑚) 𝐺 𝜈 
          
   𝑘𝑚
  𝑚 ∫ 𝑖 𝑖 𝑚 𝑖𝑘𝑚  𝜈    
    otherwise,
             3.2.4                         
where    denotes price coefficient of individual  .    
        Since the pass-through rate depends on the demand and supply elasticity, a 
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suitable model of a firm’s behavior is of great importance for the pass-through 
estimate. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) assume the firm behaves under 
Bertrand-Nash pricing strategies. Kim and Cotterill (2006) estimate cost pass-
through rates under Bertrand-Nash pricing and collusive pricing. Nevo (2001) 
assume the existence of a pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices. This 
research presented here follows Berry, Leninsohn and Pakes (1995) and Nevo 
(2001) and assumes a  Betrand-Nash equilibrium. 
        Assuming marginal costs are constant for each product but vary across 
markets, the firm  ’s profit in market  given by: 
                                       
  ∑ (        )            ,                     3.2.5 
where     is the marginal cost of brand   in market ,    is the set of brands 
produced by firm     is market size,         is the market share of brand   in 
market . The first order condition is: 
                           
   
𝑚
  𝑘𝑚
  [       ∑ (        )
   𝑚
  𝑘𝑚
    ]              3.2.6 
Rewriting  F.O.C  in vector notation, the conceptual pricing equation is: 
                                       [     ( 
     
  
)]
  
   )                            3.2.7 
where 
    
    {
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        Following Chidmi, Lopez and Cotterill (2005) as well as Richards et al. 
(2012), the marginal cost is assumed as a functional of raw milk price   , diesel 
price    , electricity price     , package size    ,  and fat content  , and month 
dummies, denoted as  . The marginal cost function then is: 
                                              (                ).                                    3.2.8 
         The most common forms for marginal cost function in the previous literature 
are the log-linear form of Berry et al. (1995) and Sudhir (2001), which gives the 
estimating equation: 
                                                      
                                                                                                                            3.2.9                                                                                                                         
where            
 ) are the unobservable factors such as marketing costs. 
        On the other side, the raw milk price is also a function of energy price, which 
is model as: 
                                                               3.2.10 
 where    are the unobservable factors that affect the raw milk price.           
 ) 
        Energy shocks are transmitted to the milk price in the following two paths: (1) 
via diesel price directly (i.e., 
  
   
); (2) via raw milk price (i.e., 
  
   
   
   
); 
        Given that this essay focuses on the pass-through rate of diesel price, a new 
model specification is obtained by substituting equation 3.2.10 into equation 3.2.9: 
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                                              ,              3.2.11                                     
where    and    are random shocks from different aspects, which can be assumed 
independent with each other, so                
    
    
  .  
        Denote           ;        ;           ;            ; 
          ;          , the model is: 
                                                     
                                                                                                                3.2.12 
        After getting parameter estimates for equation 3.2.12, assume there is a 
positive diesel price shock from   ̅̅ ̅ to   ̂. Corresponding to the energy price shock, 
the market price will converge to a new equilibrium,  ̂. The diesel price pass-
through rate ( ) is then defined as the ratio of the price change to the change in 
diesel price: 
                                                      
  
   
    ,                                       3.2.13 
where    is the difference between the new equilibrium price and old price and 
      ̂    ̅̅ ̅.  
 
 3.3 Data 
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        The milk sales data come from the Information Resources Incorporated (IRI) 
database provided by the Zwick Center for Food and Resource Policy at the 
University of Connecticut.  The milk data set contains brand-level information in 
the greater Boston area for four-week periods from January 2009 to December 
2011. Product characteristics include brand name (Garelick Farms, Garelick Farms 
over the Moon, Hood, Hood Lactaid, Hood Simply Smart, Private Label, Smart 
Balance, Stoneyfield Farm), fat content (0, 1%, 2% and 3.25%), lactose content 
(free or not)  and package size. Following Lopez and Lopez (2009), all milk types 
with less than 0.5% market share are dropped, which generates 56 products 
described by these four characteristics, which are shown in Table 1. 
        Retail prices are computed by dividing the dollar sales by volume sold. 
Market shares for each product are computed with respect to the potential market 
for milk, which was calculated by multiplying the total population of the Boston 
area by the average U.S. per capita milk consumption (USDA, 2012). The outside 
good is defined as the part of the potential market that is not considered in the 
sample, i.e., the total amount of fluid milk sold in the Boston area that is either not 
part of the 56 milk products in the sample or that is sold in other retail outlets. As a 
result, the volume of milk included in the data set used in this study represents 
approximately 65% of the potential market. Each time period was treated as a 
market consisting of 56 products and 200 consumers, which generated 2016 
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markets (56 products*36 month=2016) and 403200 (2016*200) consumer 
observations.  
        The diesel prices are from the Mid-Atlantic Information Office of the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2013), which are average monthly retail prices from 2009 
to 2011. Electricity prices are from the U.S Energy Information Administration 
(EIA, 2009-2011). 
 
3.4 Estimation and Results 
        Instrumental variables are used to address the endogeneity of price. Assume 
that demand shock   is independent of a set of exogenous instruments,  (i.e., 
   |    ). The instrumental variables used include cost shifters of milk (diesel 
price, electricity rate, wage rate, interest rate) (Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes, 1999, 
Nevo, 2001), products’ average price in other markets (Hausman and Taylor, 
1981), as well as brand dummies, month dummies and non-price product 
characteristic variables. Optimal instruments are also used to help to identify 
random coefficients and increase efficiency. Chamberlain (1987) shows that the 
efficient instruments are the expected values of the derivatives of the conditional 
moment condition with respect to the parameter, under conditional moment 
restrictions. Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) propose to use approximations to 
the optimal instruments for the BLP model. Reynaert and Verbovern (2012) 
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demonstrate that both the performance of the approximation and the exact 
implementation of optimal instruments can overcome several estimation problems 
of the BLP model and increase substantially the estimation efficiency and stability. 
This research, following Chen (2013), denotes the vector of parameter as   
     . The optimal instruments are given by Chamberlain (1987), Berry, 
Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) and Raynaert and Verboven (2012): 
                                           [
     
  
|  ̅  ]    
      
  
|  ̅    ,                     3.4.1 
where   is the mean utility and    is the market share. 
        By replacing the expected values of the derivatives in equation 3.4.1 with the 
appropriate derivatives evaluated at the expected value of the unobservables, the 
approximated optimal instruments are constructed using the following procedure: 
(a) Obtain an initial estimate   ̂          by using exogenous instrumental 
variables   
(b) Compute the predicted price  ̂ from a first–stage OLS regression, which 
is also the optimal instrument for price coefficient 
(c) Compute the predicted mean utility    ̂     ̅  ̂    ̂  
(d) Compute the predicted market share.   ̂      ̂    ̂  
(e) Compute the optimal instruments with respect to  : 
     ̂  ̂ 
   ̂
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        The demand model specified can be estimated with the complete set of 
instrumental variables, including cost shifters, Hausman-type instruments and 
Chamberlain-type optimal instruments, using a non-linear Generalized Methods of 
Moments (GMM) estimator. This research follows Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes 
(1995) and Dubé et al. (2012), applying mathematical program with equilibrium 
constraints (MPEC) approach to estimate parameters of the demand model. 
        The predicted market shares are restricted to match the observed shares, 
where   can be solved from:                     
                                                                                          3.4.2 
Let    be the full set of instrumental variables. The moment conditions are given 
by: 
                                                                   3.4.3 
Let   be the GMM weight matrix and   be the vector of parameters. The estimated 
parameters can be solved from the following constrained minimization problem:                               
                                                                      
                                       s.t.                
                                                                                                      3.4.4                       
        The estimated demand parameters are used to calculate product-specific price 
elasticities and the retailer price-cost margins. Based on the estimates, the pass-
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through rate is calculated by simulation. All the results are presented in the 
following section.  
        Table 3.2 illustrates the estimation results
16
. Overall, the results seem 
plausible in terms of signs and expected coefficients. On average, consumers have 
a negative and strong valuation of price, fat content and size. Comparing with other 
brands, consumers prefer private labels, which is consistent with the finding of 
Lopez and Lopez (2009). On the other side, the estimated parameter for lactose-
free is positive but insignificant. Table 3.2 also shows consumers’ significant 
heterogeneous preference for milk product characteristics such as price, fat 
contents and private labels, which confirms the variety of consumers’ preferences 
in the Boston fluid milk market. 
        Table 3.3 illustrates that all the own-price elasticities of demand are negative 
and all cross-price elasticities are positive for the milk products. For the private 
labels, the own-price elasticities are comparatively lower than those of other 
brands, which indicate that private labels are exerting more market power. Totally 
speaking, the values of the estimated own-price elasticities range from -9.521 for 
non-fat, one gallon private label milk, to -12.277 for 1% fat, one gallon Hood milk. 
These estimates of elasticities are within the range of conclusions given in previous 
studies focusing on fluid milk. For instance, Cotterill and Dhar (2003) provide 
                                                          
16 
A preliminary analysis is given in the Appendix 1
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own-price elasticities estimates as high as -35 for Hood milk and -3.62 for private 
label milk, while Lopez and Lopez (2009) find that the elasticities for milk in 
Boston range from -1.98 for 1% low fat private label milk to -8.52 for 1% lactose 
free Morningstar milk. Kinoshita, Suzuki, and Kaiser (2002), with scanner brand-
level data in Japan, find price elasticities in the range of -6.67 to -9.19. It is not 
surprising that the elasticities estimates in this research are relatively higher 
compared to those brand-level studies. A possible explanation is that this paper 
focuses on product level, which is smaller and defined by specific product 
characteristics, as opposed to brand level. In this research consumers have more 
substitutes to switch to, resulting higher price elasticities. 
        Table 3.4 shows that private label has the highest Lerner Index, i.e., the 
highest percent markup. This result is consistent with the finding of Lopez and 
Lopez (2009). One explanation is that, although the price of private label is 
relatively lower than other products, the marginal cost is also low so that the 
markup can be even higher than on other products.  
        Table 3.5 reports the estimation results of marginal cost function in three 
model specifications. Comparing with model 1, model2 includes company fixed 
effects which capture the effects of unobservable shocks, such as advertising and 
other marketing strategies. Model 3 includes both company dummies as well as 
month and year fixed effects, which control the unobservable factors varying with 
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time such as temperature and energy policy (e.g., biological ethanol). Based on the 
BIC and R-square, model 2 outperforms model 1 as well as model 3. The results 
show that a 1% diesel price increase will lead to a 0.42% increase of marginal cost, 
while a 1% electricity price increase leads to a 3.24% increase of marginal cost. 
The estimation results also show that a 1% package size increase will lead to a 0.51% 
decrease of marginal cost. One possible reason could be the decreasing returns to 
scale. Finally, Table 3.5 shows that products with higher fat content have lower 
marginal cost, which is plausible because skimming the fat needs more inputs (e.g., 
energy consumption, labor inputs).  
        Table 3.6 illustrates the estimated energy (diesel) pass-through rate for 56 
products. The pass-through rate ranges from 0.5539 to 0.6966, with a mean of 
0.6227, which indicates that, on average, a dollar increase in diesel price will lead 
to 0.6227 of a dollar increase of milk price.  In addition, the results show that the 
pass-through rates of private label products, generally speaking, are lower than 
those of other brands. These findings indicate that the private labels are less 
vulnerable to energy shock compared with other brands. One possible reason can 
be the higher price-cost markups of private labels. When energy shocks increase 
the cost, it is still profitable for private labels by increasing price by a smaller 
amount comparing with other brands. Also, consumers might switch from other 
products the private labels because of their slowly increasing price. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
        This essay investigates the demand for a differentiated product market 
(Boston fluid milk) and implements pass-through simulations. The demand is 
estimated with a framework of random coefficient logit model, which allows a 
more flexible curvature of demand curve. This property provides flexible pass-
through rates that are not driven solely by the functional form assumption.  
         Empirical results indicate that fluid milk products with lower price, lower fat 
content and smaller sizes are more popular. Empirical results also show that the 
private labels have lower price elasticities as well as the highest degrees of market 
power. This finding lends support to previous studies that have similarly found that 
more basic products (in this case, private label milks) benefit from greater price-
cost margins (Lopez and Lopez, 2009).  In addition, this research also finds that 
energy prices (e.g., diesel and electricity) significantly impact the prices of milk 
products. The pass-through rates are around 0.6227. More interestingly, most 
private labels are found with the lowest energy (diesel) pass-through rates, which is 
consistent with the relatively stable price of private label products. This finding 
also implies that compared to other products, private labels are less vulnerable to 
energy price shocks. 
        Future study can be fruitful in the following routes. One is to investigate 
different kinds of energy shocks comprehensively. Another one is to put energy 
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policy such biological ethanol under consideration, which could make the results 
more solid. As for methodology, a difference in differences approach can be 
another powerful tool to provide insights in this research.  
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Appendix 1: Preliminary Analysis: Causality Test   
        Table A.1 gives Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF-test) statistics for milk and 
diesel prices. The test statistics reject the null hypothesis that milk and diesel price (in 
first order difference) are non-stationary, indicating that both are stationary.  Table A.2 
shows the Johansen Test results. Based on the Trace Statistics, the hypothesis that 
maximum rank  0 is rejected, while Rank  is not rejected, which implies that milk 
price and diesel price are cointegrated.  Table A.3 gives the results of Granger causality 
test for Milk and Diesel price. The results indicate that the diesel is Granger-cause of 
milk.  
 
        Table A.1: ADF test for Stationary of Milk and Diesel Price (First Order Difference) 
  Test Statistics 1% Critical Value MacKinnon p-value 
Milk -4.265 -3.478 0.001 
Diesel -4.755 -3.478 0 
 
 
 
Table A.2:  Johansen Test for Cointegration: Milk and Diesel Price 
Maximum Rank Eigenvalue Trace Statistics 5% Critical Value 
0       --- 34.978 15.41 
1 0.144 2.518* 3.76 
2 0.012     
 
 
 
Table A.3: Granger Causality Test for Milk and Diesel Price 
Ho F statistics (P value) Chi-Square(P value) Reject or Not 
Diesel does not Granger-cause milk 3.31(0.039) 6.78(0.034) Reject 
milk does not Granger-cause diesel 0.83(0.478) 2.58(0.461) Not Reject 
Note: The choice of lags based on the minimum value of AIC and BIC. 
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                              Figure  A.1  Price of diesel and milk: 1998-2014 
       
Figure  A.2  First order difference of diesel price: 1998-2014
 
Figure  A.3  First order difference of milk price: 1998-2014
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Figure  1.1 GRPs for Coke Regular and Pepsi Regular in Boston: 2006-2008 
 
 
     Source: Constructed by authors based on television advertising dataset from the Nielsen Company 
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Figure 2.1  Stochastic Frontier for BMI Production 
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Figure 2.2: BMI production efficiency indexes in New England counties 
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Table 1.1  Summary of Carbonated Soft Drink Brand Characteristics and Market Shares 
 
Company/Brand 
Price 
$/12 
oz. 
Market 
Share 
(%) 
Weekly 
GRP 
Calories 
per 12 
oz. 
Sugar 
g/12oz 
Sodium 
mg/12oz 
Caffeine 
mg/12oz 
Coca-Cola        
Coke Reg. 0.36 5.17 194.3 140 39 50 35 
Coke Diet 0.37 4.54 101.4 0 0 40 47 
Sprite Reg. 0.41 1.14 109.7 144 38 70 0 
Coke Zero Diet 0.43 0.74 127.5 0 0 40 35 
Pepsi        
Pepsi Reg. 0.32 4.56 180.0 150 41 30 38 
Pepsi Diet 0.34 3.11 98.3 0 0 35 35 
Mountain Dew Reg. 
Sierra Mist Reg.           
0.37 
0.35 
1.54 
0.59 
131.3 
47.0 
170 
150 
46 
39 
65 
38 
54 
0 
Mountain Dew Diet 0.34 0.55 82.8 0 0 50 54 
Dr. Pepper        
Dr Pepper Reg. 0.38 1.49 192.9 150 40 55 42 
Dr Pepper Diet 0.38 1.06 70.7 0 0 55 42 
Sunkist Reg. 0.37 0.63 18.3 190 50 70 40 
7 Up Reg. 0.32 0.58 169.7 140 38 40 0 
7 Up Diet 0.31 0.46 8.3 0 0 65 0 
Note. Results are averages over 76 biweekly periods in nine designated market areas during 
2006-2008. 
 Source: The Nielsen Company 
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Table 1.2  Carbonated Soft Drink Demand Results for Alternative Advertising Models 
 
Variables 
Model 1 
No Adv. Spillovers  
Model 2 
Linear Adv. 
Model 3 
CES Adv. 
Price -1.948*** 
(0.556) 
-1.939* 
(0.679) 
-2.683*** 
(0.596) 
Sugar 
 
0.055*** 
(0.018) 
0.069*** 
(0.018) 
-0.006 
(0.016) 
Sodium 
 
-0.931*** 
(0.047) 
-0.924*** 
(0.050) 
-0.598*** 
(0.047) 
Caffeine 0.345*** 
(0.025) 
0.339*** 
(0.026) 
0.206*** 
(0.023) 
Brand Advertising 
 
Company Advertising                               
0.161*** 
(0.024) 
--- 
0.192*** 
(0.024) 
0.110*** 
(0.012) 
0.240*** 
(0.034) 
0.745*** 
(0.034) 
Competitors' Advertising 
 
--- 
 
-0.049*** 
(0.009) 
-0.048*** 
(0.008) 
Within-Group Market Share 
 
Substitution Parameter ρ           
0.872*** 
(0.009) 
--- 
0.882*** 
(0.009) 
--- 
0.905*** 
(0.009) 
0.052*** 
(0.009) 
Returns to Scale Parameter k --- --- 0.194*** 
(0.019) 
Elasticity of Substitution γ 
 
--- --- 1.055*** 
(0.010) 
Season Fixed Effects DMA YES YES YES 
DMA Fixed Effects YES YES YES 
First Stage F Stat. 
Price (p-value) 
Within-Group Mk. Sh. (p-value) 
Company Advertising 
Sargan Stat. (p-value) 
Durbin Score (p-value) 
 
17.224 (0.000) 
1578.750 (0.000) 
31428.900(0.000) 
0.461 (0.794) 
82.724 (0.000) 
 
12.865(0.000) 
1568.000(0.000) 
30764.600(0.000) 
0.497(0.780) 
79.817(0.000) 
 
12.865(0.000) 
1568.000(0.000) 
30764.600(0.000) 
3.528(0.171) 
18.794(0.000) 
Out of Sample MSE                      0.414 0.452 0.380 
RMSPE    
Observations                            
0.1623 
8820 
0.1610 
8820 
0.1468 
8820 
Note. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Elasticity of substitution is computed based on 
substitution parameter  . * indicates a 10% significance level. *** indicates a 1% significance 
level.  
Source: Constructed by authors  
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Table 1.3  Sample of Price Elasticities of Demand under Alternative Model Specifications 
 
Model 1: No Advertising Spillovers 
Brand Coke Regular Coke Diet Pepsi Regular Pepsi Diet Dr Pepper Regular Dr Pepper Diet 
Coke Regular -1.465 0.853 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.003 
Coke Diet 0.946 -1.629 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.003 
Pepsi Regular 0.016 0.014 -1.325 0.605 0.005 0.005 
Pepsi Diet 0.016 0.014 0.832 -1.695 0.003 0.003 
Dr Pepper Regular 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.009 -1.803 0.527 
Dr Pepper Diet 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.713 -1.835 
 
 
 
Model 2: Linear Advertising Spillovers 
Brand Coke Regular Coke Diet Pepsi Regular Pepsi Diet Dr Pepper Regular Dr Pepper Diet 
Coke Regular -1.572 0.931 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.003 
Coke Diet 1.033 -1.750 0.012 0.009 0.005 0.003 
Pepsi Regular 0.016 0.014 -1.422 0.660 0.005 0.003 
Pepsi Diet 0.016 0.014 0.907 -1.823 0.005 0.003 
Dr Pepper Regular 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.009 -1.938 0.575 
Dr Pepper Diet 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.009 0.778 -1.975 
 
 
 
Model 3: CES Advertising Spillovers 
Brand Coke Regular Coke Diet Pepsi Regular Pepsi Diet Dr Pepper Regular Dr Pepper Diet 
Coke Regular -2.661 1.636 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.004 
Coke Diet 1.815 -2.971 0.017 0.012 0.006 0.004 
Pepsi Regular 0.022 0.019 -2.408 1.161 0.006 0.004 
Pepsi Diet 0.022 0.019 1.595 -3.107 0.006 0.004 
Dr Pepper Regular 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.012 -3.298 1.013 
Dr Pepper Diet 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.012 1.370 -3.370 
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Table 1.4  Sample of Advertising Elasticities under Alternative Model Specifications 
 
Model 1: No Advertising Spillovers 
Brand Coke Regular Coke Diet Pepsi Regular Pepsi Diet Dr Pepper Regular Dr Pepper Diet 
Coke Regular 0.437 -0.133 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
Coke Diet -0.289 0.241 -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
Pepsi Regular -0.005 -0.002 0.446 -0.084 -0.002 -0.003 
Pepsi Diet -0.005 -0.002 -0.277 0.227 -0.002 -0.003 
Dr Pepper Regular -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 0.575 -0.050 
Dr Pepper Diet -0.005 -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.240 0.168 
 
 
 
Model 2: Linear Advertising Spillovers 
Brand Coke Regular Coke Diet Pepsi Regular Pepsi Diet Dr Pepper Regular Dr Pepper Diet 
Coke Regular 0.562 0.018 -0.146 -0.075 -0.189 -0.055 
Coke Diet 0.327 0.310 -0.146 -0.075 -0.189 -0.055 
Pepsi Regular -0.143 -0.079 0.573 0.167 -0.189 -0.055 
Pepsi Diet0.034 -0.143 -0.079 0.329 0.292 -0.189 -0.055 
Dr Pepper Regular -0.143 -0.079 -0.146 -0.075 0.741 0.124 
Dr Pepper Diet -0.143 -0.079 -0.146 -0.075 0.424 0.217 
 
 
 
Model 3: CES Advertising Spillovers 
Brand Coke Regular Coke Diet Pepsi Regular Pepsi Diet Dr Pepper Regular Dr Pepper Diet 
Coke Regular 0.256 0.174 -0.176 -0.090 -0.228 -0.067 
Coke Diet 0.674 0.258 -0.176 -0.090 -0.228 -0.067 
Pepsi Regular -0.172 -0.095 0.255 0.221 -0.228 -0.067 
Pepsi Diet -0.172 -0.095 0.509 0.245 -0.228 -0.067 
Dr Pepper Regular -0.172 -0.095 -0.176 -0.009 0.251 0.294 
Dr Pepper Diet -0.172 -0.095 -0.176 -0.009 0.470 0.239 
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Table 1.5  Price-Cost Markups ($/12 oz.) and Lerner Indexes for the Top 14 Carbonated Soft 
Drink Brands 
     Notes. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
     Source: Constructed by authors 
 
 
 
 
No Spillovers Linear Spillovers CES Spillovers 
Brand             Markup Lerner Index  Markup  Lerner Index  Markup  Lerner Index 
Coke Reg.      0.111 0.321 0.103 0.300 0.061 0.177 
 
(0.014) (0.084) (0.014) (0.078) (0.008) (0.047) 
Coke Diet 0.109 0.353 0.102 0.330 0.060 0.195 
 
(0.016) (0.088) (0.015) (0.082) (0.009) (0.050) 
Sprite Reg. 0.102 0.284 0.095 0.265 0.056 0.156 
 
(0.012) (0.065) (0.012) (0.061) (0.007) (0.036) 
Coke Zero 0.091 0.283 0.084 0.263 0.049 0.154 
 
(0.010) (0.079) (0.009) (0.073) (0.006) (0.044) 
Pepsi Reg. 0.096 0.283 0.089 0.263 0.053 0.155 
 
(0.018) (0.106) (0.017) (0.099) (0.011) (0.059) 
Pepsi Diet 0.076 0.223 0.071 0.207 0.041 0.121 
 
(0.006) (0.065) (0.006) (0.060) (0.003) (0.035) 
Mountain Dew Reg. 0.072 0.196 0.067 0.181 0.039 0.106 
 
(0.003) (0.050) (0.003) (0.046) (0.002) (0.027) 
Sierra Mist Reg. 0.087 0.278 0.080 0.259 0.047 0.152 
 
(0.014) (0.116) (0.014) (0.108) (0.008) (0.064) 
Mountain Dew Diet 0.070 0.201 0.065 0.186 0.038 0.108 
 
(0.003) (0.079) (0.002) (0.073) (0.001) (0.043) 
Dr. Pepper Reg. 0.077 0.258 0.072 0.240 0.042 0.140 
 
(0.010) (0.162) (0.010) (0.151) (0.006) (0.088) 
Dr. Pepper Diet 0.069 0.236 0.064 0.218 0.038 0.127 
 
(0.003) (0.123) (0.003) (0.114) (0.002) (0.066) 
Sunkist Reg. 0.075 0.255 0.070 0.236 0.041 0.138 
 
(0.007) (0.092) (0.007) (0.085) (0.004) (0.050) 
7 Up Reg. 0.069 0.237 0.064 0.220 0.037 0.128 
 
(0.002) (0.130) (0.002) (0.121) (0.001) (0.070) 
7 Up Diet 0.074 0.278 0.068 0.258 0.040 0.151 
(0.007) (0.129) (0.007) (0.120) (0.004) (0.070) 
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Table 2.1 Definition and descriptive statistics of the variables in the sample   
Variable Definition Mean St. dev. Min Max 
County Level 
     Supermarket Density of supermarkets and other grocery stores (per 1000 persons) 0.251 0.104 0.096 0.756 
Convenience store Density of  convenience stores  (per 1000 persons) 0.186 0.070 0.042 0.500 
Fruit and veg. market Density of fruit and vegetable markets (per 1000 persons) 0.044 0.053 0.000 0.435 
Supercenter Density of warehouse clubs and supercenters (per 1000 persons) 0.069 0.087 0.000 0.455 
Full-service restaurant Density of full-service restaurants (per 1000 persons) 0.954 0.309 0.285 3.665 
Limited-service rest. Density of limited-service eating places (per 1000 persons) 0.939 0.209 0.285 1.860 
Median income Median value of income level in each county (divided by 1000) 54046 11319 26523 84250 
Property crime rate  Number of  property crimes per 1000 persons 10.822 10.277 0.000 35.350 
Violence crime rate Number of violence crimes per 1000 persons 1.966 3.695 0.000 34.447 
Population density Number of persons per 1000 square miles in each county 1.130 2.213 0.004 12.338 
Individual Level 
     BMI Body mass index 26.502 5.026 12.171 89.019 
Age Age in years 47.900 13.841 18.000 75.000 
Children  Number of children  0.731 1.073 0.000 10.000 
Education Education level 5.076 1.000 1.000 6.000 
Income Income level 6.280 1.862 1.000 8.000 
Female 1 if female 0.574 0.494 0.000 1.000 
White 1 if race is White 0.884 0.320 0.000 1.000 
Hispanic 1 if race is Hispanic  0.051 0.220 0.000 1.000 
Black 1 if race is Black 0.031 0.172 0.000 1.000 
Asian 1 if race is Asian 0.015 0.122 0.000 1.000 
Married 1 if married  0.589 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Smoke 1 if smoked at least 100 cigarettes in entire life 0.578 0.586 0.000 1.000 
Drink 1 if drank any alcohol beverage in past 30 days 0.903 0.296 0.000 1.000 
Activity 1 if do vigorous activity more than 10 minutes in a week  0.312 0.465 0.000 1.000 
Retire 1 if retired 0.632 0.482 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2.2 Categories for metro counties and non-metro counties 
Code                                  Description 
Metro counties 
 1 Counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more 
2 Counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population 
3 Counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population 
Non-metro counties 
4 Urban population of 20,000 or more, adjacent to a metro area 
5 Urban population of 20,000 or more, not adjacent to a metro area 
6 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, adjacent to a metro area 
7 Urban population of 2,500 to 19,999, not adjacent to a metro area 
8 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, adjacent to a metro area 
9 Completely rural or less than 2,500 urban population, not adjacent to a metro area 
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Table 2.3 Econometric results - Full sample vs. Metro- sample vs. Non-metro sample.   
Variable Full sample Metro- sample Non-metro- sample 
Production Frontier Coef.    Z-value Coef.    Z-value Coef.    Z-value 
Age 0.135*** 25.22 0.129*** 22.34 0.139*** 15.00 
Children 0.012*** 12.17 0.013*** 12.54 0.020*** 9.14 
Education 1 -0.048*** -10.18 -0.031*** -5.90 -0.052*** -4.89 
Education 2 -0.009*** -4.63 -0.006*** -2.81 -0.011*** -3.08 
Income 2 -0.027*** -5.82  -0.043*** -9.15 -0.061*** -8.15 
Income 3 -0.042*** -5.53 -0.075*** -9.52 -0.086*** -8.42 
Income 4 -0.042*** -4.60 -0.094*** -10.04 -0.113*** -8.51 
Female -0.102*** -14.25 -0.114*** -13.99 -0.136*** -24.54 
White -0.010*** -2.90 -0.014*** -3.97 0.002 0.21 
Black 0.046*** 11.03 0.044*** 10.93 0.034 1.58 
Hispanic 0.016*** 4.17 0.015*** 3.89 0.007 0.68 
Asian -0.083*** -17.49 -0.086*** -17.06   -0.076*** -6.55 
Married 0.006*** 5.96 0.004*** 3.72 0.012*** 6.06 
Smoke  0.040 1.00 -0.027*** -0.58 -0.075 -1.25 
Drink -0.427*** -10.44 -0.125*** -2.79 -0.059 -1.02 
Activity -0.169*** -3.07 -0.325*** 4.89 -0.470*** -9.91 
Retire 0.220*** 15.71 0.253*** 16.79 0.296*** 13.60 
Constant 2.983*** 47.00 2.863*** 44.58 2.840*** 41.59 
Determinants  of Inefficiency 
      
Supermarket -0.136 -0.88 -0.415 -1.12 -0.028** -0.33 
Convenience store 0.020 0.19 0.235 0.89 -0.091 -1.03 
Fruit and veg. store -0.548*** -2.62 -0.596 -0.88 -0.084 -0.39 
Supercenter 0.570*** 2.90 -0.197 -0.24 0.261* 1.83 
Full-service restaurant -0.200*** -4.21 -0.335*** -3.61 -0.123** -3.96 
Limited-service Rest. 0.121* 1.69 0.213* 1.89 0.070 0.94 
Median income -5E-06*** -6.40 -6E-06** -5.66 -4E-06* -2.48 
Crime rate 0.001 0.90 0.001 0.96    0.002 1.39 
Population density -0.036** -2.26 -0.058* -1.72 -0.052 -0.21 
Constant -0.431*** -4.48 -0.453*** -3.36 -0.219** -2.02 
Distribution of u and v 
      
  
  
  
  
  
0.152*** 
0.013*** 
0.920*** 
14.81 
60.69 
207.47 
0.171*** 
0.014*** 
0.927*** 
10.69 
56.00 
154.50 
0.111*** 
0.013*** 
0.899*** 
13.88 
41.67 
145.42 
Log Likelihood                                      69938.864                            49802.71                      14648.18 
Observations                                            191837                               135467                          41545 
Note: State and year fixed effects are included in the model. Robust standard errors clustered at the county 
level are estimated via bootstrapping. Z-value are reported in the table. 
*, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively. 
 
82 
 
 
Table 2.4 Econometric results-metro counties  
Note: State and year fixed effects are included in the model. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
county level are estimated via bootstrapping. *,  **,  ***  represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, 
respectively.  Pop.>1 million stands for counties in metro areas of 1 million population or more;  
250,000<Pop. <1 million stands for counties in metro areas of 250,000 to 1 million population; Pop. 
<250,000 stands for counties in metro areas of fewer than 250,000 population. Estimated coefficients for 
consumers’ characteristics are omitted for brevity. 
   
 
  
 
       Pop.>1 million   250,000<Pop.<1 million       Pop.<250,000 
 
Coefficient        Z-Score Coefficient  Z-Score Coefficient  Z-Score 
Supermarket -0.113 -0.21 -2.853*** -2.73 -0.807 -1.06 
Convenience store -0.006 -0.01 1.643 1.43 0.661 0.89 
Fruit and veg. store -2.992** -2.07 -0.068 -0.04 1.411 0.55 
Supercenter 2.856 1.51 -1.650 -0.91 -0.569 -0.67 
Full-ser. restaurant -0.562** -2.25 0.418 1.29 0.079 0.09 
Limited-ser. rest. 0.648*** 2.68 -0.256 -0.45 -0.174 -0.39 
Median income   -5E-06*** -3.06 -3E-06 -0.71 3E-06 0.27 
Crime rate 0.006* 1.89 0.001 0.53 0.004 0.52 
Population density -0.064 -0.88 -0.003 -0.01 -0.630 -0.39 
Constant -1.077*** -3.21 -0.437 -1.02 -0.387 -0.89 
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Table 2.5 Econometric results-non-metro counties 
Note: State and year fixed effects are included in the model. Robust standard errors clustered at the 
county level are estimated via bootstrapping. *, **, *** represent the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, 
respectively.  Pop.>2500, adjacent stands for counties with urban population of 2,500 or more, adjacent to 
a metro area; Pop.>2500, not adjacent stands for counties with urban population of 2,500 or more, not 
adjacent to a metro area; Completely rural stands for counties that are completely rural or less than 2,500 
urban population, adjacent or not adjacent to a metro area. Estimated coefficients for consumers’ 
characteristics are omitted for brevity.
 
       Pop.>2500, adjacent          Pop.>2500, not adjacent       Completely rural 
 
Coefficient        Z-Score Coefficient  Z-Score Coefficient  Z-Score 
Supermarket -0.380** -2.38 0.073 0.38 -0.324 -0.12 
Convenience store 0.030 0.18 -0.038 -0.10 0.700 0.03 
Fruit and veg. store -0.434 -0.58 0.597 0.84 0.013 0.02 
Supercenter -0.137 -0.33 -0.166 -0.54 -0.519 -0.06 
Full-ser. restaurant -0.108** -2.13 -0.067 -0.89 0.177 0.15 
Limited-ser. rest. 0.268* 1.71 -0.141 -0.80 0.063 0.03 
Median income -2E-07 -0.07 -5E-06 -1.15 8E-05 0.02 
Crime rate    0.005*** 2.67 -0.002 -0.85 -0.009 -0.20 
Population density -0.890*** -2.74 -0.011 -0.01 -8.404 -0.16 
Constant -0.379*** -2.79 -0.050 -0.20 -0.438 -0.02 
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Table 2.6 Rankings of weight production efficiency for New England counties during 2001-2010 
  
Rank State  County Efficiency Rank State  County Efficiency Rank State  County Efficiency 
1 MA Suffolk 0.898 27 CT New London 0.871 53 ME Oxford 0.859 
2 NH Carroll 0.888 28 CT New Haven 0.870 54 VT Franklin 0.857 
3 MA Barnstable 0.886 29 NH Merrimack 0.870 55 ME Androscoggin 0.856 
4 CT Fairfield  0.886 30 VT Washington 0.870 56 ME Penobscot 0.856 
5 MA Norfolk 0.886 31 VT Bennington 0.870 57 VT Caledonia 0.856 
6 RI Washington 0.882 32 MA Franklin 0.870 58 ME Kennebec 0.855 
7 RI Bristol 0.882 33 NH Belknap 0.870 59 ME Piscataquis 0.855 
8 RI Newport 0.881 34 VT Addison 0.870 60 ME   Aroostook  0.853 
9 MA Middlesex 0.880 35 ME York 0.870 61 ME Washington 0.851 
10 MA Cumberland 0.880 36 NH Cheshire 0.869 62 ME Somerset 0.845 
11 VT Grand Isle 0.879 37 RI Kent  0.868     
12 CT  Litchfield 0.879 38 MA Worcester 0.867     
13 ME Lincoln 0.879 39 ME Sagadahoc 0.867     
14 VT Windham 0.878 40 NH Sullivan 0.867     
15 MA Hampshire 0.878 41 RI Providence  0.866 
    
16 NH Grafton 0.877 42 NH Strafford 0.865 
    
17 ME Hancock 0.877 43 VT Lamoille 0.865 
    
18 VT Chittenden 0.876 44 ME Franklin 0.864 
    
19 NH Rockingham 0.876 45 ME Waldo 0.863 
    
20 MA Plymouth 0.875 46 MA Bristol 0.862 
    21 CT Tolland 0.874 47 CT Windham 0.862 
    22 ME Knox 0.874 48 NH Coos 0.861 
    23 MA Essex 0.873 49 MA Hampden 0.861 
    24 CT Hartford  0.872 50 VT Orange 0.861 
    25 VT Windsor 0.872 51 VT Rutland 0.860 
    26 NH Hillsborough 0.871 52 VT Orleans 0.860 
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Table 3.1. Summary of Milk Product Characteristics. 
Company/Brand Price Mark. Share Fat Lactose-Free Size/Gallon 
Dean Food/Garelick 
     Garelick Farms 1 5.949 0.002 0 0 0.25 
Garelick Farms 2 4.725 0.007 0 0 0.5 
Garelick Farms 3 3.632 0.007 0 0 1 
Garelick Farms 4 6.016 0.003 0.01 0 0.25 
Garelick Farms 5 4.731 0.009 0.01 0 0.5 
Garelick Farms 6 3.62 0.013 0.01 0 1 
Garelick Farms 7 5.984 0.002 0.02 0 0.25 
Garelick Farms 8 4.731 0.008 0.02 0 0.5 
Garelick Farms 9 3.654 0.011 0.02 0 1 
Garelick Farms 10 5.967 0.003 0.0325 0 0.25 
Garelick Farms 11 4.735 0.007 0.0325 0 0.5 
Garelick Farms 12 3.642 0.011 0.0325 0 1 
Dean Food/Garelick F. o.t. M.  
     Garelick Farms over the Moon  1  5.897 0.002 0 0 0.5 
Garelick Farms over the Moon  2 5.917 0.001 0.01 0 0.5 
Hood/Hood 
     Hood 1 6.085 0.002 0 0 0.25 
Hood 2 4.607 0.007 0 0 0.5 
Hood 3 3.44 0.011 0 0 1 
Hood 4 5.736 0.001 0.01 0 0.25 
Hood 5 4.66 0.008 0.01 0 0.5 
Hood 6 3.473 0.015 0.01 0 1 
Hood 7 6.048 0.001 0.02 0 0.25 
Hood 8 4.699 0.007 0.02 0 0.5 
Hood 9 3.602 0.011 0.0325 0 1 
Hood 10 5.636 0.001 0.0325 0 0.25 
Hood 11 4.747 0.007 0.0325 0 0.5 
Hood 12 3.654 0.013 0.0325 0 1 
Hood/ Hood Lactaid 
     Hood Lactaid 1 9.531 0.0005 0 1 0.25 
Hood Lactaid 2  7.680 0.003 0 1 0.5 
Hood Lactaid 3 7.625 0.002 0.01 1 0.5 
Hood Lactaid 4 9.569 0.0003 0.02 1 0.25 
Hood Lactaid 5 7.682 0.002 0.02 1 0.5 
Hood Lactaid 6 7.604 0.001 0.0325 1 0.5 
Hood/ Hood Simply Smart 
     Hood Simply Smart 1 6.137 0.009 0.01 0 0.5 
Hood Simply Smart 2 6.156 0.005 0.01 0 0.5 
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Private Label 
     Private Label 1 5.375 0.001 0 0 0.25 
Private Label 2 3.966 0.018 0 0 0.5 
Private Label 3 2.843 0.065 0 0 1 
Private Label 4 6.691 0.001 0 1 0.5 
Private Label 5 5.238 0.0005 0.01 0 0.25 
Private Label 6 3.849 0.021 0.01 0 0.5 
Private Label 7 2.806 0.118 0.01 0 1 
Private Label 8 5.208 0.003 0.02 0 0.25 
Private Label 9 3.835 0.016 0.02 0 0.5 
Private Label 10 2.817 0.076 0.02 0 1 
Private Label 11 6.633 0.001 0.02 1 0.5 
Private Label 12 5.391 0.002 0.0325 0 0.25 
Private Label 13 3.836 0.019 0.0325 0 0.5 
Private Label 14 2.836 0.096 0.0325 0 1 
Private Label 15 6.564 0.0003 0.0325 1 0.5 
Smart Balance/ Smart Balance 
     Smart Balance 1 6.061 0.001 0 0 0.5 
Smart Balance 2 5.908 0.001 0 1 0.5 
Smart Balance 3 5.950 0.0002 0.01 0 0.5 
Stonyfield Farm/Stonyfield Farm 
     Stonyfield Farm 1 7.383 0.003 0 0 0.5 
Stonyfield Farm 2 7.367 0.003 0.01 0 0.5 
Stonyfield Farm 3 7.388 0.002 0.02 0 0.5 
Stonyfield Farm 4 7.370 0.003 0.0325 0 0.5 
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Table 3.2.  Demand Estimation Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
  
                   Mean Utility              Unobservables 
Variable Mean Standard 
Errors 
Mean Standard 
Errors 
Price -2.281*** (0.626) -0.467* (0.245) 
Fat -11.799** (5.219) -28.536** (2.252) 
Lactose-Free 0.960 (1.812) 1.511 (0.790) 
Size -2.789* (1.479) -0.618 (0.450) 
Garelick Farms -5.550 (3.395) -4.201 (2.903) 
Garelick Farms o. t. Moon -7.110 (5.805) -4.086 (4.028) 
Hood -5.076 (8.733) -3.097 (9.224) 
Hood Lactaid -1.240 (2.761) 1.213 (4.701) 
Hood Simply Smart -4.343 (85.345) -3.311 (52.119) 
PLs 
Smart Balance                                       
-4.114*** 
-16.001* 
(1.115) 
(9.690) 
-6.220* 
-8.034 
(3.717) 
(4.983) 
Constant -10.477*** (4.117) 0.890 (1.901) 
Month Fixed Effect Yes 
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Table 3.3. Sample of Price Elasticities of Demand for Milk Products 
Product 
Garel. 
Farm 6    
Garel. 
Farm 9    
Hood 6  
Hood 
12 
Hood 
Lact. 2 
Hood  
Lact. 3 
Private 
Label 3 
Private 
Label 10 
 
Private 
Label 14  
Stonyfield 
Farm 1 
Garelick Farms 6 -11.370 0.017 0.014 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.042 0.035 0.033 0.030 
Garelick Farms 9 0.014 -11.920 0.013 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.041 0.035 0.032 0.030 
Hood 6  0.018 0.019 -12.277 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.053 0.048 0.040 0.037 
Hood 12 0.018 0.018 0.017 -11.976 0.014 0.019 0.051 0.045 0.039 0.033 
Hood Lactaid 2 0.018 0.019 0.017 0.015 -11.525 0.019 0.048 0.046 0.041 0.038 
Hood Lactaid 3 0.015 0.017 0.016 0.012 0.013 -10.715 0.045 0.041 0.035 0.030 
Private Label 3 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.015 -9.521 0.037 0.033 0.030 
Private Label 10 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.013 0.014 0.018 0.046 -9.753 0.037 0.031 
Private Label 14 0.017 0.018 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.019 0.045 0.045 -10.432 0.031 
Stonyfield Farm 1 0.015 0.016 0.014 0.013 0.013 0.017 0.045 0.039 0.032 -11.967 
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  Table 3.4. Price, Marginal Cost and Lerner Index 
Company/Brand Price MC Price-MC Own-price Ela. 
Lerner 
Index 
Dean Food/Garelick 
     Garelick Farms 1 5.554 5.050 0.504 -11.604 0.091 
Garelick Farms 2 5.476 4.962 0.513 -11.571 0.094 
Garelick Farms 3 5.476 4.963 0.513 -11.352 0.094 
Garelick Farms 4 5.464 4.951 0.514 -11.483 0.094 
Garelick Farms 5 5.339 4.824 0.515 -11.237 0.097 
Garelick Farms 6 5.356 4.833 0.523 -11.370 0.098 
Garelick Farms 7 5.361 4.855 0.505 -11.134 0.094 
Garelick Farms 8 5.351 4.838 0.513 -11.498 0.096 
Garelick Farms 9 5.426 4.910 0.516 -11.920 0.095 
Garelick Farms 10 5.417 4.899 0.518 -11.799 0.096 
Garelick Farms 11 5.355 4.829 0.526 -11.657 0.098 
Garelick Farms 12 5.381 4.862 0.519 -11.734 0.096 
Dean Food/Garelick F. o.t. M.  
     Garelick Farms o. t. Moon  1  5.390 4.869 0.521 -11.821 0.097 
Garelick Farms o. t. Moon  2 5.479 4.948 0.531 -11.798 0.097 
Hood/Hood 
     Hood 1 5.456 4.934 0.522 -11.535 0.096 
Hood 2 5.556 5.030 0.526 -11.612 0.095 
Hood 3 5.803 5.287 0.516 -12.340 0.089 
Hood 4 5.816 5.290 0.526 -12.229 0.090 
Hood 5 5.818 5.299 0.519 -12.170 0.089 
Hood 6 5.812 5.287 0.526 -12.277 0.090 
Hood 7 5.847 5.328 0.519 -12.400 0.089 
Hood 8 5.799 5.278 0.521 -12.617 0.090 
Hood 9 5.852 5.339 0.513 -12.359 0.088 
Hood 10 5.834 5.317 0.518 -12.490 0.089 
Hood 11 5.649 5.133 0.515 -12.198 0.091 
Hood 12 5.667 5.144 0.523 -11.976 0.092 
Hood/ Hood Lactaid 
     Hood Lactaid 1 5.665 5.156 0.510 -11.516 0.090 
Hood Lactaid 2  5.663 5.149 0.514 -11.525 0.091 
Hood Lactaid 3 5.130 4.611 0.519 -10.715 0.101 
Hood Lactaid 4 4.902 4.377 0.525 -10.251 0.107 
Hood Lactaid 5 4.753 4.225 0.528 -9.851 0.111 
Hood Lactaid 6 4.842 4.322 0.520 -10.130 0.107 
Hood/ Hood Simply Smart 
     Hood Simply Smart 1 4.649 4.133 0.516 -9.483 0.111 
Hood Simply Smart 2 4.664 4.139 0.525 -9.487 0.113 
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Private Label 
     Private Label 1 4.554 4.013 0.541 -9.571 0.119 
Private Label 2 4.533 3.991 0.542 -9.537 0.120 
Private Label 3 4.548 4.007 0.541 -9.521 0.119 
Private Label 4 4.581 4.039 0.542 -9.407 0.118 
Private Label 5 4.546 4.003 0.543 -9.574 0.119 
Private Label 6 4.530 3.982 0.548 -9.577 0.121 
Private Label 7 4.603 4.056 0.548 -9.639 0.119 
Private Label 8 4.669 4.116 0.553 -9.726 0.118 
Private Label 9 4.633 4.092 0.541 -9.764 0.117 
Private Label 10 4.669 4.118 0.551 -9.753 0.118 
Private Label 11 5.173 4.634 0.539 -9.880 0.104 
Private Label 12 5.234 4.682 0.552 -9.993 0.105 
Private Label 13 5.390 4.851 0.540 -9.873 0.100 
Private Label 14 5.444 4.904 0.541 -10.432 0.099 
Private Label 15 5.794 5.277 0.517 -11.875 0.089 
Smart Balance/ Smart Balance 
     Smart Balance 1 5.649 5.148 0.502 -11.549 0.089 
Smart Balance 2 5.553 5.052 0.501 -11.566 0.090 
Smart Balance 3 5.578 5.084 0.494 -11.711 0.088 
Stonyfield Farm/Stonyfield Farm 
    Stonyfield Farm 1 5.801 5.298 0.503 -11.967 0.087 
Stonyfield Farm 2 5.711 5.208 0.503 -12.042 0.088 
Stonyfield Farm 3 5.708 5.203 0.505 -11.742 0.088 
Stonyfield Farm 4 5.659 5.159 0.500 -12.036 0.088 
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                Table 3.5. Estimation of Cost Function 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                          
Independent Variables    
Log(marginal cost) (1)        (2) (3) 
Log(diesel) 0.257***  0.424*** 0.425*** 
 
   (0.033) (0.086) (0.086) 
Log(electricity) 1.925*** 3.241*** 3.241*** 
 
   (0.151)     (0.127)      (0.127) 
Log(feed)      0.117***      0.117***      0.119** 
     (0.026)     (0.018)      (0.047) 
Log(size)    -0.526***     -0.512***    -0.512*** 
 
   (0.124)     (0.009)      (0.009) 
Fat    -3.391***     -4.734***     -4.735*** 
 
   (0.503)     (0.412)      (0.413) 
Constant    -3.319***     -6.079***  -6.093*** 
 
   (0.310)     (0.247)      (0.325) 
Hood (Manufacturer Brand)        No      0.233***      0.233*** 
          (0.018)     (0.018) 
Smart B. (Manufacturer Brand)        No    -0.063***    -0.063*** 
      (0.044)     (0.044) 
PLs        No    -0.161***     -0.161*** 
          (0.036)     (0.036) 
Stonyfield Farm (Organic)        No     0.492***      0.491*** 
      (0.044)     (0.043) 
Month Dummy        No        No         Yes 
Year  Dummy      No   No Yes 
BIC 370.696 -1031.09 -938.506 
R2    0.502        0.755        0.756 
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                        Table 3.6. Pass-through Rate Estimates 
Company/Brand Pass-through Rate 
Dean Food/Garelick 
 Garelick Farms 1 0.6353 
Garelick Farms 2 0.6431 
Garelick Farms 3 0.5668 
Garelick Farms 4 0.6099 
Garelick Farms 5 0.5989 
Garelick Farms 6 0.6319 
Garelick Farms 7 0.5821 
Garelick Farms 8 0.5878 
Garelick Farms 9 0.6241 
Garelick Farms 10 0.6481 
Garelick Farms 11 0.6275 
Garelick Farms 12 0.6100 
Dean Food/Garelick F. o.t. M.  
 Garelick Farms o. t. Moon  1  0.6683 
Garelick Farms o. t. Moon  2 0.5864 
Hood/Hood 
 Hood 1 0.6330 
Hood 2 0.5941 
Hood 3 0.6678 
Hood 4 0.5608 
Hood 5 0.6422 
Hood 6 0.6530 
Hood 7 0.6312 
Hood 8 0.5540 
Hood 9 0.6664 
Hood 10 0.6019 
Hood 11 0.5593 
Hood 12 0.6582 
Hood/ Hood Lactaid 
 Hood Lactaid 1 0.6245 
Hood Lactaid 2  0.6388 
Hood Lactaid 3 0.6966 
Hood Lactaid 4 0.6802 
Hood Lactaid 5 0.6221 
Hood Lactaid 6 0.6520 
Hood/ Hood Simply Smart 
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Hood Simply Smart 1 0.6737 
Hood Simply Smart 2 0.6328 
Private Label 
 Private Label 1 0.6876 
Private Label 2 0.5886 
Private Label 3 0.6371 
Private Label 4 0.6005 
Private Label 5 0.5611 
Private Label 6 0.6436 
Private Label 7 0.5746 
Private Label 8 0.6165 
Private Label 9 0.6290 
Private Label 10 0.6208 
Private Label 11 0.6305 
Private Label 12 0.6289 
Private Label 13 0.5793 
Private Label 14 0.5746 
Private Label 15 0.5782 
Smart Balance/ Smart Balance 
 Smart Balance 1 0.6392 
Smart Balance 2 0.5862 
Smart Balance 3 0.6231 
Stonyfield Farm/Stonyfield Farm 
Stonyfield Farm 1 0.6502 
Stonyfield Farm 2 0.6134 
Stonyfield Farm 3 0.6536 
Stonyfield Farm 4 0.6552 
 
